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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ETHICS OF (NON) ADVERSARY PROCESS-
OF ROLES AND RULES
The romantic days of ADR appear to be over. To the extent that
proponents of ADR, like myself, were attracted to it because of its
promise of flexibility, adaptability, and creativity, we now see the need
for ethics, standards of practice and rules as potentially limiting and
containing the promise of alternatives to rigid adversarial modes of
dispute resolution. It is almost as if we thought that anyone who
would engage in ADR must of necessity be a moral, good, creative,
and, of course, ethical person. That we are here today is deeply ironic
and yet, also necessary, as "appropriate" dispute resolution struggles
to define itself and insure its legitimacy against a variety of theoretical
and practical challenges.
While one strand of ADR (the one with which I identify-"quali-
tative"-better processes and solutions) has always associated itself
with pursuing "the good" and the "just," the other strand of ADR
(quantitative, efficiency concerned, cost-reducing, docket clearing)
has produced institutionalized forms of dispute resolution in the
courts and in private contracts. To the extent that ADR has become
institutionalized and more routine, it is now practiced by many differ-
ent people, pursuing many different goals. Demonstrating another
form of irony is a recent continuing education program that advertised
itself as "How to Win in ADR!"1 Thus, lawyers as "advocates," as
well as "problem-solvers" and parties now come to the wide variety of
dispute resolution processes with a whole host of different intentions
and behaviors, many of which may be inconsistent with the original
aims of some forms of ADR. As skillful advocates try to manipulate
ADR processes in order to achieve their conventional party max-
imization goals,2 the rules of behavior demanded in ADR become
both less clear and in some respects even more important.
Even for those well intentioned "ethical" problem-solvers (whom
I call "solution maximizers") utilizing new forms of ADR, including
repetitive use of neutrals and multiple roles (people acting both as
neutrals in some contexts and as counsel in others), have created a
variety of new problems for considering whether there is something
1. See Defense Research, Inc., Winning in ADR and Negotiation-ADR FOR THE
DEFENSE (Sept. 21-23, 1995) (on file with author). My personal favorite is a letter from
one counsel to another stating, "I am filing an ADR against you."
2. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale
of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991).
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that just "bothers" us about how the process is conducted or outcomes
achieved.3
In this Article I describe a matrix of dilemmas presented by new
forms of practice in ADR that are simply not resolved by currently
existing rules of ethics for lawyers and third-party neutrals, when roles
played in ADR are sufficiently different and complex to require their
own "rules." 4 Dependence on lawyer ethical rules will not work first,
because representatives (counsel) and third-party neutrals perform
different roles in ADR from traditional adversary practice and sec-
ond, because there is so much variation in the roles of practicing
ADR, ethics rules in ADR will have to be more sensitive to the varia-
tions of task and-functions within different ADR forms and settings.
Underlying my argument is the claim that where ADR seeks to ex-
press different values with respect to both dispute resolution and jus-
tice, its standards or rules of ethics must be responsive to a different
set of underlying values than informs traditional adversary ethics.
The first and most important dilemma is one that has plagued me
throughout my career as a lawyer-scholar-practitioner: the power-
ful heuristic of the adversary model and its concrete expressions in
legal dispute resolution as a paradigm which does not aid, indeed,
makes more difficult, the resolution of "ethical" dilemmas when one
seeks to use other processes.5 To put it at its most concrete, as I have
asserted in debate with many legal ethicists,6 the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct (still based on an adversarial conception of the ad-
3. In a study of ethical dilemmas of mediators, Baruch Bush defined ethical dilem-
mas as those which caused some discomfort or ambiguity for practicing mediators because
choices of courses of action produced conflicting possibilities, given potentially conflicting
values (such as promising confidentiality and using information to achieve good solutions).
See Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Di-
lemmas and Policy Implications, 1 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 3 (1994), reprinted in DWIGHT Go-
LANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DisPuTEs, ch. 14, Ethical Dilemmas (1996) (published originally
as Report for National Institute for Dispute Resolution (1992)).
4. This article, which focuses on the problems of creating ethics rules in ADR, is the
first in a series I have planned. In subsequent articles I will look at some solutions to some
of these issues and dilemmas. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers, GEO. J. LEG. ETHics (forthcoming, 1997).
5. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a Post
Modern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 6 (1996).
6. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ancillary Practice and Conflicts of Interests: When
Lawyer Ethics Rules Are Not Enough, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LmG. 15,
15 (1995) (disagreeing with Professor Geoffrey Hazard that ADR is an "ancillary service");
cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., When ADR is Ancillary to a. Legal Practice, Law Firms Must
Confront Conflicts Issues, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 147,147 (1994)
(finding lawyers who practice mediation in law firm contexts must be cautious to adhere to
both ADR and traditional legal norms).
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vocate's, including "counselor's", role) is not responsive to the needs,
duties, and responsibilities of one seeking to be a "non-adversarial"
problem-solver and the Code of Judicial Conduct,7 while perhaps
helpful for arbitrators, is not responsive to the particular needs, duties,
and responsibilities of the now wide variation in third-party neutral
practices. Rules premised on adversarial and advocacy systems, with
legal decision-makers, simply do not respond to processes which are
intended to be conducted differently (in forms of communication, in
sharing of information, in problem analysis and resolution) and to
produce different outcomes (not necessarily win-loss, but some more
complex and variegated solutions to legal and social problems). Thus,
despite the conclusions of other well-respected scholars, like Geoffrey
Hazard and John Feerick,8 I do not believe any of the currently
drafted rule systems (the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Judicial Code of Conduct, the AAA-ABA-SPIDR Joint Standards of
Conduct for Mediators, the Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers9) provide adequate guidance for modern "ethical" dilemmas fac-
ing lawyers, parties, clients and neutrals in the wide variety of ADR
processes.
To be specific, and to introduce what I will discuss in greater de-
tail below, when mediators now function both as facilitators and as
evaluators,10 and lawyers work both as litigators, and as neutrals, the
variety of behavioral repertoires located in single individuals or role
conceptions challenges the categorization required for rulemaking.
When practitioners within ADR approach their work with entirely
different philosophical conceptions of what they are doing, "solving
problems" or "representing clients," there may either be a mismatch
of understood ethical norms or at the very least, a potential lack of
7. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
8. See generally John D. Feerick, Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 79 JUDICA-
TURE 314, 315 (1996) (discussing developments of the various standards and specifically
commenting on the Joint Committee Standards).
9. See Carrie Menkel Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers: Lawyering As Only an Adversary Practice, GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS (forthcoming
1997).
10. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies,
and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7, 25 (1996); cf.
Marjorie Corman Aaron, Evaluation in Mediation, in GOLANN, supra note 3, at ch. 10
(discussing the framework and consequences of the mediator assuming an evaluative role);
Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTER-
NATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 31, 31-32 (1996) (finding the evaluative role too
much like traditional adversarial proceedings and conflicting with the mediator's neutral
stance).
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clarity of purpose.11 What is appropriate when the game is clear (ad-
versary representation), although arguable12 in many instances, be-
comes alarmingly uncertain when we are not even playing the same
game.
This leads me to the second dilemma-at what level are we talk-
ing about ethics? Attempts to specify rules in our more common liti-
gation contexts, despite the differences in criminal and civil law,
advocacy and advice, government service and private law work, focus
on what I think of as the micro (behavioral or positivist) aspects of
lawyering-when must a lawyer tell an opposing counsel about a fact
or new law, when must a lawyer disqualify himself, when must a law-
yer discuss a question of strategy with her client? Whatever our de-
bates about these difficult questions, they are intended to focus on
what we should do in a particular instance. As I will illustrate below,
ADR needs answers to these kinds of good practice questions-when
must a neutral disqualify herself, what use may be made of informa-
tion revealed in a mediation session, when may a mediator meet sepa-
rately with a party or advocate? But, ADR (as well as traditional
adversary practice) presents what I would call macro (or jurispruden-
tial) ethics questions too-when is a process or outcome fair or just?'3
To what extent can ethics rules address such issues as whether one
process or another is more fair, just,' 4 or has greater integrity for the
parties or their dispute? Lest you think these are easily severable
problems consider one of the most troubling of our ethical dilemmas
11. These philosophical differences of purpose are also manifested in the "psychologi-
cal" role strain that individuals may feel when they are asked to perform different roles
within the same legal system. Where there are competing norms, orientations or, as I like
to call them "mind-sets," of how to behave, lawyers may suffer from both psychological
and sociological "role strain." See Robert G. Meadow & Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Person-
alized or Bureaucratized Justice in Legal Services: Resolving Sociological Ambivalence in
the Delivery of Legal Aid to the Poor, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 397, 411-12 (1985); see also
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 759-60 (1984). Formal recognition of these role
differences can be located in the three person arbitration panel (where at least two of the
arbitrators are thought to be partisan and the third "neutral") and the practice in some
countries, such as Germany, of training judges separately from lawyers.
12. By talking about adversary ethics I do not mean to suggest that there is total
agreement about what those ethics are. Although I refer here to the "positive" law of the
Model Rules and Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, many controversies remain
about how ethical dilemmas in adversary practice should be resolved.
13. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2687-91 (1995) (sug-
gesting that settlements can be justified on moral grounds).
14. See generally Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Jus-
tice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47,49-52 (1996) (arguing that mediation should look
to law for just outcomes).
SOUTH TEXAS LAw REVIEW
in ADR-when is a solution suggested or imposed by a third party
neutral too coercive 5 on the parties? Consideration of this question
clearly implicates both macro justice questions and micro behavioral
questions of how a third-party neutral should act, with particularity, in
a mediation session.
A third dilemma is jurisdictional on two levels. First, what pro-
fessional body will oversee ethical regulation-is ADR ethics regula-
tion the sole province of lawyers, (implicating the controversial
question of whether ADR is the practice of law)' 6 or should we hope
to share transdisciplinary regulation with other professions, as the
Joint Standards seeks to do? What do we do if different professions
suggest different treatments of particular problems?17 Second, what
do we do about the current development of plural approaches to ethi-
cal dilemmas at different levels of the legal system? Conflicts in "res-
olution" of such issues as unauthorized practice of law,'" conflicts of
interest,19 and advice giving20 in mediation have already emerged
from different jurisdictions.
A fourth dilemma presents an issue deeply structured in our juris-
prudence-the separation of private and public spheres of action.
15. See generally Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk
of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359 (1985) (discussing
the risks of racial and ethnic prejudice during informal ADR processes in relation to more
formal adjudication); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women,
100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (discussing the inherent danger informal processes such as me-
diation can have for women's rights).
16. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES
TO THE HIGH COST OF LiTIG. 1, 60 (1996) (questioning whether ADR ethics are subject to
lawyer's ethical standards); cf. Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers Who Mediate Are Not Practicing
Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LrrIo. 74, 74 (1996) (arguing, in response
to Menkel-Meadow, that mediators are not practicing law).
17. For example, psychologists, but not necessarily lawyers, are bound to reveal cer-
tain confidences under the Tarasoff doctrine. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
529 P.2d 553, 561 (Cal. 1974) (en banc); cf. Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality
of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 957-66 (1988) (stating that there is a limit
to Federal Rule of Evidence 408's promise of confidentiality: under some circumstances
communications can be admitted into evidence).
18. See D.C. Or. R. 49, Unauthorized Practice of Law (mediation is not the practice
of law) contrasted to Florida's regulation of mediation as performable only by lawyers.
19. See N.D. CAL. Loc. R. 2-5(d) (1995) (setting forth the Northern District of Cali-
fornia's criteria for conflicts of interests of ADR neutrals).
20. See Commission Report on Dispute Resolution, Tennessee Supreme Court (on
file with author) (suggesting that the giving of legal advice to both parties jointly is "not a
legal opinion"); see also Sandra Purnell, The Attorney as Mediator-Inherent Conflict of
Interest, 32 UCLA L. REV. 986 (1985) (suggesting that communicating legal information is
not giving legal advice).
21. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Understanding The Limits of Court-Connected ADR:
A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2170
[Vol. 38:407
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To what extent can private parties contract for ADR (without public
scrutiny) when what they are contracting for is legal dispute resolu-
tion, a function committed to the public sphere?22 Under what cir-
cumstances should courts review private action?23 Given the analytic
separation of private contractual ADR (pre-dispute) from post-dis-
pute public court referral to ADR,24 we must consider both the regu-
latory forms and enforcement mechanisms for different sites and
practices of ADR. With both private organizations (like J.A.M.S./En-
dispute and the AAA) and court ADR programs promulgating their
own rules of practice and ethics, the breadth, reach and enforcement
mechanisms for an ethics of ADR become highly pluralistic, substan-
tively conflictual and procedurally cumbersome.25 For example, while
those of a law and economics bent might suggest allowing private con-
tracting around ethics choices with a few clear default rules when the
parties choose not to contract or forget to, such solutions beg the
question of how private contracts are entered into in the first place.
Although attempts to void contractual arbitration in contracts of ad-
(1993) (concluding that "procedural reform that explicitly permits parties to combine pri-
vate ADR and traditional adjudication might be desirable").
22. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2620 (1995) (setting forth the proposition that legal disputes are public goods and
should be conducted in the public realm).
23. At the present, court deferral at least to private arbitration (if not mediation
which has not been litigated yet) is strong. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10
(1996) (listing the limited standards for court review); Doctor's Assoc. Inc. v. Casarotto,
116 S. Ct. 1652, 1654 (1996) (sustaining pre-dispute arbitration contract clause against state
statute requiring special notice); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
1212, 1219 (1995) (sustaining an award of punitive damages in arbitration); Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (compelling arbitration in contract of
employment dispute which involved age discrimination); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (upholding an arbitration agreement in
an anti-trust dispute).
24. See generally Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analy-
sis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1994) (distinguishing between ex ante ADR and ex post ADR).
These categories can also be decomposed. Parties may engage in post-dispute private con-
tractual forms of ADR (such as the mini-trial or voluntary, contractual mediation or arbi-
tration after the dispute arises). Similarly, now that some courts require certain referrals to
ADR, we may speak of "pre-dispute" public assignments to ADR when the parties are on
notice of a court-required ADR proceeding before they file their lawsuits.
25. The state of Florida has addressed this by establishing statutory standards for
qualifications, ethics, and discipline of court and legally recognized mediators and arbitra-
tors. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.106 (West 1996) (listing rules for certified and court-ap-
pointed mediators); Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators
and Florida's Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 701, 706 (1994)
(recognizing that such standards are organic and likely to change and evolve).
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hesion have so far failed in most jurisdictions,26 the question of
whether ex ante contractual agreements to engage in ADR or to
waive certain ethical objections will remain enforceable continues to
be raised in the courts.27 Further, appealing entirely to freedom of
contract or private choices does not deal with the important issues of
ethics in court-sponsored ADR programs or in situations where par-
ties cannot (through unequal bargaining power or simple ignorance)
or do not choose to contract in advance.
Thus, in considering ethics problems in ADR we must be mindful
of these dilemmas-what philosophical paradigm informs what we are
trying to do (and I suggest here that adversary frames will not do if we
are really trying to develop alternative conceptions of legal problem-
solving). 28 How can we approach simultaneously jurisprudential and
behavioral standards? At what level of generality, particularity, and
rule-system can we regulate, if at all?29
In this Article, I will review some of the concrete ethical issues
facing us at this cross-roads, to suggest that current adversarial con-
ceptions of lawyer's ethics will not do and we will, in my view, have to
develop a particular 30 set of ethical considerations, as well as rules, for
what I have here denominated as non-adversarial ethics. Concern
with the ethics of ADR will, of necessity, have to focus on both the
26. But see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing
to enforce a contractual provision to arbitrate a sexual harassment complaint on basis that
employee did not "knowingly" agree to arbitrate such claims).
27. See, e.g., Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability To Sue, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1997, at Al. See Pryner v. ractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997) (re-
jecting a compulsory arbitration process in a collective bargaining agreement in an employ-
ment discrimination case).
28. For an excellent description of how analytic "frames" can affect legal and policy
decision making, see DONALD SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD
THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES (1994).
29. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799,
804 (1992) (constructing "a matrix of lawyer-client interactions that highlight certain key
contextual differences"); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv.
468, 470 (1991) (suggesting an approval "that tailors ethical rules designed to foster a pub-
lic-spirited view of lawyering to relevant differences in legal practice").
30. I have argued in other contexts that transsubstantive ethics (and procedural) rules
may no longer work in our legal system where case complexity and variety may require
more particularized rule and standard setting. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the
Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1162
(1995). For another argument that ethics rules should be particularized to reflect lawyers'
different roles and substantive areas of practice, see Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing
Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 169 (1997).
[Vol. 38:407
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macro (justice) and micro (behavioral) aspects of practice, though it
may be easier to regulate in some areas than others.31
I begin with a brief intellectual history of ADR and legal ethics
to develop the context in which we are struggling and then turn to
some specific instances of ethical dilemmas in ADR to illustrate some
of our choices and alternatives. We cannot yet definitively solve all of
these problems, but I hope to both elevate and-clarify the conversa-
tions and considerations of issues we must address.32
II. THE CONTEXT: A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LEGAL ETHICS
The development of the alternative dispute resolution move-
ment 33 recapitulates many of the issues of American jurisprudence.
31. in an early attempt to deal with this issue, I suggested that we might begin by
framing a core of ADR ethics issues about which most ethicists and practitioners could
agree (such as no contingent fee for service, conflicts of interest and disclosures and party
consent to process). See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility for Third-
Party Neutrals, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH. COST OF LITIG. 129,130 (1993). We could
then focus on the more contested issues such as whether mediation was the practice of law
(in prediction and advice giving). Within two weeks of publication of this approach, it
became clear to me that there were few "core" areas of agreement; some mediators rou-
tinely accept bonuses dependent on outcomes (a form of "contingent fee") and conflicts of
interest has become one of the major issues of controversy. Some have suggested that
market forces will be adequate for regulation of ethics in the field-those who are unethi-
cal will simply not be chosen by private parties or the courts. For an argument that negoti-
ation is "self-regulating", see Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (1989).
32. I currently chair the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, a body consisting of academics, corporate and private
practitioners, public interest lawyers, nonlawyer neutrals and judicial officers, which in-
tends to develop some guidelines and policy directions in this area within the next few
years. The Commission has developed a clearinghouse of materials on ethics in ADR, ai
national, state and local levels, including legislation, reported cases, ethics opinions by bar
associations and other regulatory bodies and private organizations' ethics rules. We are
currently compiling a collection of "ethics hypotheticals" from which to develop some
"best practice" suggestions. Inquiries should be directed to the Commission's staff direc-
toi, Vice President of CPR, Elizabeth Plapinger, 366 Madison Ave., New York, New York,
10017.
33. See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983) (reviewing
historical. roots of non-court forms of dispute resolution in the United States including
specialized commercial and immigrant-ethnic forms of dispute resolution); EDWARD A.
DAUER, MANUAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1995) (providing the practitioner with a
broad and accessible treatment of the law and the practice of dispute resolution); STEPHEN
B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND OTHER
PROCESSES (2d ed. 1992) (reviewing and presenting the processes of negotiation, media-
tion, and adjudication as they have been combined in a number of ways to enrich the
hybrid dispute resolution process); CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE
IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985) (discussing
the neighborhood justice center as an area of alternative dispute resolution reflecting the
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ADR serves a metonymic function for understanding the tensions in
the development of our legal system from formalism to realism, 34 rule-
based to standard-based laws, formal equality to substantive equal-
ity,35 law to equity, substance to process, statute to common law, uni-
form to particular and most recently, justice to care.36 These
oppositional (some would say competing and "adversarial") charac-
teristics of a legal system illuminate the difficulties of expressing single
values or virtues in one system. Whenever we create one model or
mode of problem-solving (certainty, rule-based conceptions, such as
"no vehicles in the park ' '37) we immediately see the need for interpre-
tations and exceptions (When is a tricycle not a vehicle? When does
an emergency justify violation?). Legal systems, like most idea sys-
tems, Hegel would tell us, are subject to correction through dialectical
processes in which each thesis contains its antithesis. So, as formalism
spawned realism, the rigidity of rules and the "limited remedial imagi-
nation of courts, ' 38 gave (re)birth to the more flexible and hybrid
forms of mediation, mini-trials and settlement conferences which were
intended to provide not only more flexible processes but more party-
sensitive and complex solutions than the traditional litigated outcome.
And, as dissatisfaction with courts increased,39 both because of in-
dominant ideology and institutionalization of information); THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE, VOLUME 1: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (Richard Abel ed., 1982) (reviewing the
developments of informal dispute resolution in a variety of sociological contexts); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolution: The Periphery Becomes the Core, 69 JUDICATURE
300 (1986) (reviewing STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION).
34. See generally Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1151 (1985) (reviewing the movements in American legal thought).
35. See generally Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1279 (1987) (discussing the legal equality doctrine and a vision of substantive sexual
equality).
36. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THE-
ORY AND WOMAN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (covering different modes of thinking about
relationships and the association of these modes with male and female voices); JOAN C.
TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE (1993)
(discussing "why the switch from 'women's morality' to a care ethic is necessary"); ROBIN
WEST, CARING ABOUT JUSTICE (1997) (discussing the application of women's concerns
about interpersonal care to jurisprudential considerations of the meaning of justice).
37. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 662 (1958) (discussing what is "good law" and the task of interpreta-
tion within various legal philosophies).
38. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Struc-
ture of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 791 (1984).
39. Whether there is in fact more or less litigation and more or less satisfaction with it
than in some historical golden age, is of course, subject to great debate. See Marc S. Ga-
lanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4,
15-16 (1983).
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creased caseloads and the difficulty of using courts to effectuate solu-
tions in both the creative formation and execution stages, at least
some disputants looked to new forms and institutions, with greater
flexibility, both to solve problems in more creative ways, and to allow
more parties to participate in potential resolution.4 °
ADR then, began to articulate, in practice, if not in high flying
theory, its own "institutional competence" to provide different kinds
of processes and different kinds of solutions than those offered by leg-
islatures, courts or administrative agencies. 41 At its best, ADR was
intended to provide more creative, particularized, flexible and. partici-
pative solutions to problems than the more traditional and adversary
legal system could offer. Early (modern) proponents of ADR from
Frank Sander,42 Roger Fisher and William Ury43 to me44 argued that
the courts were not meeting the needs and underlying interests of par-
ties and others (particularly those outside of the "case") so that other,
non-dyadic and non-adversarial formats which better met the interests
of parties were necessary.
45
40. For the argument that dispute resolution, especially public policy mediation, is
more democratic than other forms of dispute resolution, see John Forester, Lawrence Suss-
kind: Activist Mediation and Public Disputes, in WHEN TALK WORKS, PROFILES OF
MEDIATORS (Kolb ed. 1994); and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation:
The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 NEGOT. J. 217,
223 (1995).
41. If this sounds like Legal Process theory, it is. In the 1950's Hart and Sacks, as well
as their sometime jurisprudential adversary, Lon Fuller, articulated an institutional compe-
tence (or "institutional settlement") justification for some forms of informal dispute settle-
ment-with its own logic and advantages, if not its own ethics. See HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994) (discussing the process and impact of arbitration in Chapter 2); Lon L. Fuller,
Mediation-Its Forms and Its Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971) (discussing the
particular qualities of mediation and its "appropriateness" for some forms ('multiplex") of
disputes).
42. See Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address given at the
Pound Conference on Causes of Dissatisfaction with Justice (1976), reprinted in THE
POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (Leo Levin & Russell
Wheeler eds., St. Paul, Minnesota, West 1979) (discussing alternative methods to resolve
growing burden of cases on the federal justice system); see generally THE POUND CONFER-
ENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (Leo Levin & Russell Wheeler eds., West
1979) (discussing the proceedings of the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice including dispute resolution).
43. See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETING To YES (Bruce Patton
ed., 1982) (explaining skills for artful negotiation).
44. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 759-60.
45. See generally JOHN M. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION (1981) (discussing gener-
ally the emphasis of "win-lose" outcome in divorce court and the personal and economic
hardships associated with that emphasis); SALLY E. MERRY & ANN M. ROCHELEAU, ME-
DIATION IN FAMILIES: A STUDY OF THE CHILDREN'S HEARINGS PROJECT (1985).(discuss-
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As with all cyclical human history, the reforms of flexibility, infor-
mality, particularity and privacy have led to their own set of abuses
and that is why we are here today. ADR now needs "ethics" or stan-
dards in part because of its successes-it is being challenged from
within as well as without. As I have argued at length elsewhere, the
institutionalization of ADR in courts has tended to lead to the co-
optation of some of the original goals of ADR with strategic use by
advocates seeking to maximize client gain, 46 'adulteration of some of
the original goals of ADR by seeking docket-clearing efficiency (such
as in seeking to "narrow issues" for trial at settlement conferences or
early neutral evaluation sessions, when creative settlements are more
often fostered by having multiple or expanding issues to trade) and
institutional competence abuses (when is a court no longer a court? 47).
The use of ADR in the courts presents a whole host of ethics and
other issues48 -patronage bestowed, confidentiality, ex parte commu-
nications49 -some of which can be responded to by traditional court
processes or statutory means50 and others of which cannot.
In the private sphere ADR is also threatened by co-optation or
abusive practices. Repeat players in the third-party neutral role raise
such micro level concerns as whether neutrals should disqualify them-
selves from past, present or potential future conflict situations, or to
put it at its most extreme, but real, form, whether repeat players
(providers, as well as individuals) should never be used in particular
circumstances (such as in pre-contract appointment of specific neu-
trals in employment disputes)? 51 As we move to private systems of
informal and private decision-making some have questioned whether
ing use of mediation in family law cases); LAWERENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK,
BREAKING THE IMPASSE (1987) (discussing environmental and public policy disputes).
46. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 3.
47. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS (1981) (discussing the comparative institutional competencies of various forms
of dispute processing formats); THE COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS, THE ROLE OF
COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Jethro Lieberman ed., 1984) (discussing trends and
changes in adjudication activities); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073
(1984) (criticizing settlement over adjudication); Luban, supra note 22, at 2619 (discussing
adjudication as preferable to settlements).
48. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Judicial Referral to ADR: Issues and Problems Faced
by Judges, 7 F.J.C. DIRECTIONS 8, 8-11 (Dec. 1994).
49. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ex Parte Talks with Neutrals: ADR
Hazards, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 109 (1994) (discussing ethical
practices in ex parte communications in the ADR context). ,
50. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1993) (judicial conflicts of interest statute).
51. See J.A.M.S./ENDISPUTE, POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS § VI (1996).
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settlements are entered into coercively and secretly52 without the pro-
tections of the rule of law, public accountability for decision-making
and equalization of economic and psychological or social power im-
balances. As some third-party neutrals are granted immunity because
they are either servicing the judicial system or acting in "quasi-judi-
cial" capacities,53 some worry that there will be no way to monitor
competence or quality and our legal system will not only fail to pro-
duce publicly declared precedents, but will produce "bad" private jus-
tice. In other situations, parties (or the neutral) have been accused of
violating contract terms or good faith by breaching confidentiality, en-
gaging in self-dealing and promotion and rapacious competitive
behavior.
In short, our flexible, adaptive and creative processes, "alterna-
tives" to litigation and court have produced their own abuses and we
are here today because some urge a return to the formalism and "ri-
gidity" of clearly established rules, norms and standards of conduct.
Our "informal" system is in need of "policing" and ethical sanctions
(as well as other internal regulation) may be necessary in order to
maintain public confidence and legitimacy.54
Other historical and sociological forces have affected the environ-
ment we face. Scholars of the sociology of the professions have told
us that the creation of "new" professions attempts legitimacy through
the promulgation of ethical codes and rules, thus signaling a nascent's
profession's right to control itself.5 5 Thus, as the "turf" wars of law-
yers, psychologists, economists, social workers and accountants are
now heating up over social control of the human capital of ADR cre-
dentials,56 development of an ethics code provides another tool (and
52. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to Private Settlements: Conflicting
Legal Policies, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 85, 86 (1993).
53. See Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Meyers v. Contra
Costa County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987); Howard v.
Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901-02 (Ct. App. 1990).
54. See Preface to AAA-ABA-SPIDR MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS (1994) (stating the purpose of promulgating standards for mediators).
55. See MAGALI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALY-
sis (1977); RONALD M. PAVALKO, SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 25-26
(2d ed. 1988).
56. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (1996) (discussing how human capital is developed in international arbitra-
tion); Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Fussing About the Forum: Categories and Definitions
as Stakes in a Professional Competition, 21 L. & SOC. INOUIRY 285 (1996) (discussing how
the field of professional competition in dispute processing has changed the field of business
disputes).
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some would say "weapon") in the ongoing competition between con-
stitutive professions.
Intellectual history is embedded in our enterprise as well and that
is the story of the promulgation of legal ethics rules and standards.
That history has been well-rehearsed elsewhere57 and does not need
repeating here except to note that in our efforts to deal with ethical
issues or dilemmas in ADR we are faced with similar legislative and
political problems. At what level of generality or particularity should
we address our standards? Should we aim for enforceable "rules" or
aspirational "ethical considerations? '"" What underlying economic,
status, class or other competitions underlie the contestations about
particular ethical treatments (such as conflicts of interests-are we
maximizing repeat player "quality" or "monopoly"; defining media-
tion as the practice of law to include or exclude non-lawyers?). Are
we academics and "framers" and developers of rules rationalizers and
legitimators for the practitioners?59 In short, while concern about eth-
ics and "doing good" in ADR, whether as advocate or third-party
neutral, seems motivated by a praiseworthy concern for quality and
good practices, debates about ethical codes and standards are almost
always characterized by contesting interests of their own-economic,
status, philosophical and professional.
In my view, one of the most important functions of the inquiry we
are embarked on here is the self-conscious reflection that debate
about ethical codes can bring to the surface about our purposes and
functions and expose the real differences among us. Where there is
debate, disagreement, contest or modification, we can hope to seek
57. See generally JERALD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976) (discussing the social and political history of the
legal profession and its regulation); Judith Lichtenberg, What's A Code of Ethics For?, in
DEBORAH RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the role of
the Code of Ethics in the legal profession); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promul-
gate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1981) (providing a discussion and criticism of the
role ethical rules play in the profession); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A
Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1981) (discussing the
historical development of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility); Ted Schneyer,
Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989) (discussing the history and development of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct).
58. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 953, 954 (1980).
59. This particular group likely has conflicts of roles and interests of its own. How
many of us (including myself) are practitioners as well as ethicists, with what interests? See
generally DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 56 (discussing the role of academics in framing
and constituting the changes in areas of international commercial arbitration and business
disputes).
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clarification and consider the multiple values we seek to express in our
endeavors to use ADR for "good" ends.
And now, on to some specifics...
III. THE ETHICS OF ADR: WHERE THE (CURRENT, ADVERSARY-
BASED) RULES DON'T HELP
A. Of Roles and Rules: Third-Party Neutrals and Party
Representatives: Is ADR the Practice of Law?
At the threshold level we must decide what form of ethics regula-
tion is desirable and possible. Rule drafters and commentators have
already framed a variety of approaches, some contradictory, to this
problem. Is "thepractice of ADR" part of law practice, as some have
argued,60 so that at least initially, ethics problems can be directed to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, or is "ADR" and all its
forms its own form of practice, requiring transdisciplinary but role-
specific rules, such as those the Joint Standards for the Conduct of
Mediators attempts to create? Thus, the issue is "joined," as we say in
legal parlance, because how one defines the role(s) of participants in
ADR may suggest different ethical treatments.
My own, somewhat controversial, views are as follows: Role mat-
ters and it matters in complicated ways, related to the specific tasks
performed in ADR, which themselves may cut across, but implicate,
professional disciplinary lines. ADR contemplates the creation of
new and different roles-tasks and practices are derived from legal,
therapeutic, economic and problem-solving disciplines. 61 Fashioning
standards of practice from and for different disciplines for different
roles and tasks thus presents a formidable challenge. Thus, for me,
many forms of ADR practice do involve law and are, in my view, the
practice of law,62 but they also involve other ways of thinking about
and practicing problem-solving.
60. See generally Hazard, supra note 6 (discussing ADR as a part of practicing law).
61. See generally DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PRO-
FESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983) (providing ethnographic descriptions of different
kinds of professional problem solving and decision making); Donald A. Schon, Educating
the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 231 (1995) (identifying ways law
professors can transmit "learning, knowledge, and creativity" to students).
62. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 15; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 59.
But cf. Bruce Meyerson, supra note 16, at 74-75 (arguing that mediation is not the practice
of law).
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1. The Varieties of Third-Party Neutraling
First, one must separate the function of a lawyer-advocate or rep-
resentative in an ADR proceeding, whose duties and responsibilities
may vary depending on whether the proceeding is an arbitration with
relatively well-controlled rules of evidence and traditional adversarial
proceedings, or mediation, with more flexible procedures and rou-
tines, from those of the third party neutral. A third party neutral is
not a "representative" of a party and thus is seemingly taken out of
the lawyer rules, including Model Rule 2.2's intermediary role, which
contemplates a representative capacity for two or more clients.63 Yet,
third-party neutrals now perform a wide variety of functions-includ-
ing arbitration (covered alternatively by AAA's Ethics Rules, specific
contract rules, or as argued by some, the Judicial Code of Conduct),
facilitative mediation (governed by such rule systems as the AAA-
ABA-SPIDR Joint Standards of Conduct for Mediators, the American
Academy of Family Mediators Ethics Codes, the ABA Standards of
Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes), evaluative media-
tion' and hybrid forms such as med-arb,65 mini-trials, settlement con-
ferences, early neutral evaluations and summary trials, some of which
are voluntary and consensual and others of which may not be.66
While arbitration and some forms of early neutral evaluation and
evaluative mediation may assimilate themselves to ethics rules like the
Judicial Code of Conduct that assume some "judgmental" distance be-
63. But cf. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYER-
ING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 511 (2d ed. Supp.
1997) (suggesting that a mediator "represents" all parties); see also CHARLES W. WOLF-
RAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 835 (1986) (noting the broad scope and imprecise defini-
tions in many state statutes regulating unauthorized practice of law, and explaining that
unauthorized practice restrictions do not prevent a lawyer from providing advice to
nonlawyers not under her supervision). I cannot resist suggesting that many of the ethics
writers who think of mediation as "representation" in this traditional sense. have never
themselves actually mediated. See Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A
Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 509-14 (1991) (discussing
the author's proposed ethical standards for mediators); see also Glen Sato, The Mediator-
Lawyer: Implications for the Practice of Law and One Argument for Professional Responsi-
bility Guidance-A Proposal for Some Ethical Considerations, 34 UCLA L. REV. 507,
525-34 (1986) (proposing a scheme to aid a lawyer raised on adversarial conduct to be a
mediator, based on ethical standards).
64. See Aaron, supra note 10, at 267-305.
65. See Stephen B. Goldberg, Grievance Mediation: A Successful Alternative to Labor
Arbitration, 5 NEGOT. J. 9, 10-13 (1989); see.also Stephen B. Goldberg, The Case of the
Squabbling Authors: A Med-Arb Response, 6 NEGOT. J. 391, 392-96 (1990).
66. See generally CPR Inst. for Disp. Resol., The ABCs of ADR: A Dispute Resolution
Glossary, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LrrIG. 147 (1995) (outlining a list of
various types of ADR procedures).
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tween decision-maker and litigants, other hybrid forms will not lend
themselves to such easy role separation. The evaluative mediator, for
example, will hear confidential information, what I have called "settle-
ment facts,"'67 from both parties if there has been any attempt to settle
before advising or prediction, as will a judge who conducts his or her
own settlement conference.68 Thus, the flexibility and variety of ADR
neutrals' roles make reliance on currently existing ethical standards
problematic. Some have tried to define away the problem by sug-
gesting that "pure" mediation is always facilitative,69 that mediators
can give neutral, non-representational information, that is not adver-
sarial "advice" or "prediction"7 and others have chosen to simply
state that mediation is not the practice of law (because it does not
involve representation of parties71). Judith Maute has argued that me-
diation can be likened to "limited representation," a role contem-
plated by Rule 1.2(c) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which allows parties to contract for "less than" full representation.72
In my view, the great variety of roles and tasks taken on by third-
party neutrals demonstrates the failure of the adversary model to pro-
vide standards of acceptable behavior in these areas. In a recent func-
tional analysis of mediator roles, Margaret Shaw, an experienced
mediator, has developed a spectrum of tasks performed by mediators
ranging from simply giving information or answering parties' ques-
tions about their case and elements of proof, to asking parties to re-
spond to each other's arguments, performing risk analysis, giving
67. 'Tese are "facts" which may not be legally relevant but which either go to the
underlying needs, interests, and objectives of the parties-why they want what they want in
a dispute-or such sensitive information as financial. information, insurance coverage,
trade secrets, future business plans that may affect the possible range of settlements or
solutions but which would not necessarily be discoverable in litigation. Settlement facts
are to be distinguished from "legal facts" (those which would be either discoverable or
admissible in litigation). ,
68. See Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 869 (Ct. App. 1995).
69. See Kovach & Love, supra note 10; at 32; cf. John Bickerman, Evaluative Media-
tor Responds, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 70, 70 (1996) (suggesting
that pure facilitative mediation may work in certain contexts, but parties usually want opin-
ions as to strengths and weaknesses of each side).
70. See Sandra E. Purcell, The Attorney as Mediator-Inherent Conflict of Interest? 32
UCLA L. REV. 986, 1009-10 (1985) (arguing -that legal information can be objectively
given with both parties present and thus, is not practicing law).
71. See, e.g., Examination of Rule 49 Committee of the District of Columbia Bar,
Proposed Clarification and Revision of District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 49
Concerning the Unauthorized Practice of Law § C, at 10 (on file with author) (definition-
ally excluding mediation from the practice of law); Report to Tennessee Supreme Court
Commission on Dispute Resolution (on file with author) (suggesting that legal opinions
given in mediation, with all parties present, are.not to be considered legal opinions).
72. See Maute, supra note 63, at 515.
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opinions about elements or the strengths and weaknesses of parties'
cases (either in separate or joint meetings), giving opinions about the
ranges of case settlements, predictions about court rulings and finally,
proposing particular settlements. 73 This continuum of mediator activi-
ties ranging from information giving, to advice, prediction and eventu-
ally, evaluation, suggestion (of solutions) or decisions (usually non-
binding in evaluative mediation), in my view, clearly implicates the
practice of law. As courts have held, in other contexts, usually inter-
preting unauthorized practice of law provisions in ethics codes or
criminal laws, when an individual uses "an ability to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the client's case vis a vis that of the ad-
versary, 74 she is practicing law, by applying legal principles to con-
crete facts and exercising legal judgment. Although, in mediation, the
third party neutral is not "representing" the party (and indeed, in
many cases the parties will be represented and can obtain a profes-
sional's advice about the law), parties may still rely on what is said to
them by a more activist mediator.
As the law continues to expand liability of lawyers to third parties
not in privity with the professional,75 this reliance interest may prove
troubling in the mediation context.76 Thus, when mediators give legal
information, whether or not "neutrally and objectively" stated or
presented with more partisan or predictive casts, they may, in effect,
be "practicing law" without a representational relationship 77-an en-
tirely new role for ethics purposes.
And, some third-party neutrals see it as their duty to "correct"
misstatements of law or to expose "false" facts.78 The authors of the
73. See Margaret Shaw, Evaluation Continuum, Prepared for Meeting of CPR Ethics
Commission (May 6-7, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
74. Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 351 A.2d 229, 234 (Pa. 1976) (enjoining
insurance adjustors who were not lawyers from giving advice to insurance claimants).
75. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Privity Requirement Reconsidered, 37 S. TEX. L.
REv. 967, 968-75 (1996).
76. In actuality we already know of cases in which unrepresented parties rely on what
mediators tell them about the law, the likelihood of their success in court and whether a
settlement is a good idea or not. See GOLANN, supra note 3, at 420 (discussing when
mediation may induce "detrimental reliance" by the parties on what is told to them in the
process).
77. Traditional ethics codes treat this as not practicing law so as to separate judicial
functions from representational ones, but my point here is that mediators may be some-
where in between, demonstrating a hybrid form of "practicing law without a representa-
tional relationship." Reliance on what a third-party neutral like a mediator says is
different than "rulings" on the law by either judges or arbitrators.
78. For a useful discussion of some of these difficult dilemmas see Curtis Emery von
Konn, Is Your Mediation Ethical?, Session at ABA Annual Meeting, ABA Sect. on Disp.
Resol. (Orlando, Fla. Aug. 1996) (on file with author).
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Joint Standards, however, take the opposite view and suggest that the
"mediator should ... refrain from providing professional advice,"79
demonstrating the lack of clarity and consensus in the field.
To further complicate matters, several courts have already held
that third-party neutrals (of all types) who serve the courts in a wide
variety of capacities (probation officers, mediators, evaluators, even
court-appointed psychologists) will be granted quasi-judicial immunity
for their services,8" thus rendering whatever legal advice or informa-
tion which is given (whether bad or not) immune from scrutiny. Thus,
the dilemma is that if third-party neutrals are not practicing law and
are immune (at least while serving in courts) there will be no mecha-
nism for accountability and quality control.
To conclude, as I do, that the flexibility of the mediator's role
includes the provision of legal information and advice and thus, "the
practice of law," does not resolve by what standards of ethics or per-
formance 81 a third-party neutral should be judged. Indeed, as the Ju-
dicial Code of Conduct and other definitions of judicial roles clearly
exclude judges from "practicing law" (in an assumed representational
capacity), the mixed role of mediator or evaluator (or "settlement ori-
ented" arbitrator) is not dealt with adequately by any existing code.
Current legal ethics codes assume a clear distinction (based on
our adversary system) between the advocates and the neutral, impar-
tial and passive decision-maker who operates at arms-length from the
parties.82 When the mediator-evaluator or settlement-oriented arbi-
79. See Symposium, Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion, 1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 95, 127. "Mixing the role of mediator and the role of a profes-
sional advising a client is problematic, and mediators must strive to distinguish between the
roles. A mediator should therefore refrain from providing professional advice." Comment
to STANDARD VI. Quality of the Process, ABA, AAA-SPIDR JoINT STANDARDS FOR
CONDUCT OF MEDIATORS (1994). In my view, this language flies in the face of actual
practice in the field where mediators quite commonly provide legal information, advice,
and evaluation in a variety of contexts.
80. See, e.g., Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Meyers v. Contra
Costa County Dep't. of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1987); Howard v.
Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 902 (Ct. App. 1990).
81. Is competence and quality an ethical concern? See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1995) (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representa-
tion, including legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and reasonably necessary
preparation).
82. See generally STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION
AND DEFENSE (1984) (detailing the history and prevalence of adversarialism in the judicial
process); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
382-83 (1978) (describing the adversial roles of judge, arbiter, and representative of par-
ties); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 40 (discussing that adversarialism is so powerful
that it infects non-adversarial possibilities of dispute resolution).
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trator or judge83 blurs those lines of distance and non-involvement in
certain aspects of the case (like sharing of confidential information
and actively engaging in promoting "consensual" settlements) 81 none
of our existing regulatory schemes will help us judge what has hap-
pened. Thus, I come to the problematic view that even the "practice
of third-party neutraling" (below I will examine the issues for advo-
cates) implicates the practice of law (as well as a host of non-legal
competencies)85 but the current practice of law (or judging) rules do
not guide the ethical issues which are raised in modern ADR practice
which are particular to the new and hybrid forms of processes and
behavior. The issue of what responsibility the third-party neutral
bears within ADR remains unresolved and controversial. Some argue
that mediators should be fully accountable for the outcomes over
which they preside86 and for "counter balancing" unequal power, even
if it means losing some neutrality in the mediation.87 Others argue
that neutrality and non-involvement with the parties' consensual
agreements must be the cornerstone of the third party's role. 88
2. The Changing Roles of Parties, Representatives, and "Advocates"
While we continue to debate whether ADR is a good or bad idea
(supplanting or supplementing89 more formal judicial systems90) it is
83. On the settlement practices of judges, see D. M. PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATE-
GIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES (Federal Judicial Center 1986); Wayne D. Brazil,
Hosting Settlement Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3 OHIO ST. J. Disp.
RESOL. 1 (1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of
the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 497-98 (1985).
84. See supra note 13-15 and accompanying text (raising the issues of macro ethics as
to when we know a settlement is not "coerced").
85. As my colleague Howard Gadlin (an ombudsperson and psychologist) has opined,
should psychologists only regulate the communication and facilitation activities of media-
tion and other dispute resolution processes since those are within their disciplinary
purview?
86. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability
Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1981).
87. See generally Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Im-
pact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984) (mediat-
ing domestic abuse cases requires mediators to protect victims of violence); Maute, supra
note 63, at 504.
88. See Leonard L. Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Media-
tion, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 330 (1984); Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of
Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 86 (1981).
89. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors, Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211, 241-62 (1995).
90. This debate is international. As the new market economies of formerly Commu-
nist countries develop, entities like the World Bank seek to promote both predictable and
legitimated judicial systems, as well as the "fair and effective dispute resolution mecha-
nisms" of commercial ADR. See Memorandum from Steven G. Raikin, Esq. on the Public
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important to note that the behaviors, skills and tasks of parties and
their representatives may be called on in different ways in these alter-
native processes. The zealous advocate who jealously guards (and
does not share) information, who does not reveal adverse facts (and in
some cases, adverse law) to the other side, who seeks to maximize
gain for his client, may be successful in arbitrations and some forms of
mini-trials and summary jury trials.
However, the zealous advocate will likely prove a failure in medi-
ation, where creativity, focus on the opposing sides' interests, and a
broadening, not narrowing of issues, may be more valued skills. In-
deed, in the second generation of ADR training9' which now focuses
on training the representatives how to "be" in a mediation or other
ADR setting, there is recognition that certain aspects of the conven-
tional adversarial role may, in fact, be disadvantageous for effective
behavior and the achievement of Pareto optimal solutions in settle-
ment contexts.92 Such principles as "reactive devaluation" in which
one side simply discounts proposals from the other side because the
proposals come from the other side,93 teach us that we will have to
relearn how to process and prepare information in a settlement-ori-
ented setting.
Some have suggested the settlement function is sufficiently differ-
ent from the adversarial function requiring different individuals, with
different personalities and orientations as well as ethics.94 Thus, as
Education Campaign on Commercial Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Russia
(Oct. 4, 1996) (on file with author).
91. The first generation of ADR training included both training third-party neutrals
(either in mediation or arbitration skills) and educating counsel about the range and "land-
scape" of disputing for choices about what forms of ADR to elect. See CPR INSTITUTE
FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, WORKSHOP: MEDIATION ADVOCACY 1-23 (1996) (training
modules developed for law firms and corporate ADR programs led by Carrie Menkel-
Meadow).
92. See Robert Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 235, 238 (1993); see generally KEN-
NETH J. ARROW ET AL., BARRIERS TO CONFLICr RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al.
eds. 1995) (providing a superb discussion of some of these behavioral and cognitive distor-
tions caused by a focus on adversarial thinking processes).
93. See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26, 28 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
94. See Roger Fisher, What About Negotiation as a Specialty? 69 A.B.A. J. 1221, Sept.
1983 (discussing the inherent differences between litigators and negotiators); Marguerite S.
Millhauser, Gladiators and Conciliators: ADR-A Law Firm Staple, 14 B. LEADER 20, 20
(Sept.-Oct. 1988). This raises issues of psychological aptitude and affinity for different
processes, as well as whether training can, in fact, recast adversarialists into problem-solv-
ers and whether law is the best domain for situating mediational strategies. See Margaret
L. Shaw, Selection, Training and Qualification of Neutrals (Oct. 15-16, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript presented for the State Justice Institute's National Symposium on Court Con-
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courts struggle with such legal issues as what it means to attend a set-
tlement proceeding "in good faith, '95 representatives of parties (which
is the term I prefer to the term "advocates") have to consider how to
become effective in a different forum.96 A different orientation to the
client and to the "adversary" may be essential in the kind of creative
option generation and problem-solving that is essential in a mediation
setting.
In addition to behavioral orientations or mind-sets, specific acts
may be subject to different ethical criteria. If parties are present in an
early neutral evaluation proceeding in a law office, for example (as is
the practice in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California), are lawyers duty-bound to reveal adverse legal authority
as they are required to before a tribunal (see MRPC 3.3) or are they
engaged in private negotiations governed by MRPC 4.1?9
Suggesting alternative behaviors, like cooperative and creative
problem-solving,98 is not the same as mandating it, yet ethical guide-
lines or "considerations" might do more to change the culture than
simply ignoring these issues and letting traditional adversarial behav-
iors continue to control new processes. At the very least, some tradi-
tional ethical codes have been amended to require lawyers to, at least,
advise their clients of the existence of alternative forms of dispute res-
nected Dispute Resolution Research, on file with author). Some may simply find too much
psychological, sociological, and professional role strain in the different roles. See generally
Jonathan M. Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advo-
cates Be Wise Negotiators? 34 UCLA L. REV. 863 (1987) (discussing the different roles of
the litigator and the negotiator, and the barriers faced).
95. Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form
of Participation Should Be Required? 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2089 (1993).
96. For a more extended discussion of my views of how lawyers and law students need
to be trained to think differently in order to solve problems, rather than advocate for them,
see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing
from the MacCrate Report-Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH.
L. REV. 593 (1994); see generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not Make
Them: Integrating ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. REV. 1995 (1993) (dis-
cussing the integration of ADR into law school curriculum as a way to expand the concept
of the lawyer as an altruist); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and
Realities-What We Learn from Mediation, 56 MOD. L. REV. 361 (1993) (discussing the
teaching of negotiation with the aim of improving lawyering); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Measuring Both the Art and Science of Mediation, 9 NEGOT. J. 321 (1993) (discussing train-
ing in empathy as indispensable to the success of any mediation program).
97. For a sampling of these real ethical dilemmas in ADR in the court setting, see
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Federal Judicial Center ADR Implementation Workshop, Ethical
and Other Issues in Using ADR Neutrals: Session 10 Hypotheticals for Group Discussion
(Kansas City, Mo., Sept. 18-21, 1994) (on file with author).
98. See, e.g., JAMES ADAMS, CONCEPTUAL BLOCKBUSTING: A GUIDE TO BETTER
IDEAS Xi (1986); MARTIN GARDNER, AHA! INSIGHT vi (1978).
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olution.99 A variety of new continuing legal education courses and
materials now attempt to teach lawyers how to "advocate" for and in
ADR proceedings.'
Related to the lawyers' role in advising and counseling clients is
the role of the client in different kinds of proceedings. Once again,
our traditional legal ethics rules address themselves to lawyers, but
what of party responsibilities-to simply attend' 0 ' or to actively en-
gage in solution-seeking behavior, or to consider the needs and inter-
ests of other parties? 0 2 Rules prohibiting advocates from contacting
represented parties and preventing clients from doing the same, in
some cases, may be dysfunctional when we want to encourage the par-
ties to talk to each other to resolve their problems. The appropriate
rules of contact for third-party neutrals, representatives, and parties in
joint sessions and caucuses are complex, dependent on different cau-
cus philosophies, and left completely unanswered by conventional eth-
ics rules. 10 3 Thus, the conceptual frameworks that inform alternative
dispute resolution processes change the rules of the game being
played. Participants of all kinds-lawyers, parties and third-party
neutrals-are asked to do different things, to approach each other
with different mind-sets,' °4 and to seek different outcomes for their
disputes and transactions, from what they might seek in the formal
arena of litigation. These different goals and behaviors, in my view,
thus require their own role and task sensitive standards.
99. COLO. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1996); see Donald
A. Burkhardt & Frederic K. Conover, II, The Ethical Duty to Consider Alternatives to
Litigation, 19 COLO. LAW. 249, 249 (1990).
100. See generally ERIC GALTON, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION (1994) (dis-
cussing the strategies and techniques for litigators to use in the mediation process);
Michael Lewis, Advocacy in Mediation: One Mediator's View, 2 DisP. RES. MAG. 7, 7
(1995) (discussing the differences between typical lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation and media-
tion, and the techniques for advocates).
101. See, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th
Cir. 1988) (en banc) (discussing duty of parties to attend settlement conferences).
102. See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGA-
TION 47 (1995) (suggesting that victims of mass torts might have some moral and ethical
responsibilities to consider all the victims of a mass disaster); Menkel-Meadow, supra note
30, at 1171.
103. For example, many mediators ask to meet with parties, sometimes even without
counsel, when it appears that either the parties are being recalcitrant, or have particularly
good business ideas or personal needs for settling the case. Although there is some ethical
"folklore" about the propriety of meeting with parties without their counsel (it is probably
unwise to do so without the parties' permission), there is nothing which officially prohibits
this sometimes very effective way to solve problems.
104. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 794-842 (noting the importance of mind-
set or orientation to problem-solving in setting the behavioral context).
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3. Why It Matters: How Non-Adversarial Practice Requires Its
Own Rules
In considering what principles should inform ethical standards
and rules, it is important to understand the underlying values that lay
the foundation for ethical rules. With the adversary practice as the
model current rules are based upon, values of zeal (I prefer to high-
light the "zealotry" implicated in zeal), client loyalty, partisanship and
non-accountability" 5 reign. If ADR draws from different founda-
tional principles-problem-solving, joint rather than individual gain,
and future rather than past orientation, its underlying principles will
be different. Trust, confidentiality, creativity and openness may sug-
gest different ethical precepts and standards. Questions of accounta-
bility and legitimacy still loom large and controversial at the macro
level, but it might be possible to craft rules and standards on such
issues in ADR where goals can be distinguished and articulated (such
as a third-party neutral must disclose whether he will leave the solu-
tion to the parties or will pass judgment on the legality or fairness of
proposals for settlements over which he will preside).
In addition, the use of ADR in the public sphere, through court-
annexed programs, implicates important constitutional and statutory
issues of ethics and standards. When is a jury trial waived in court-
annexed programs? 10 6 What is the role of court-appointed mediators,
special masters, early neutral evaluators as agents of the state, as judi-
cial officers? Are there due process questions when court-appointed
neutrals are struck from the lists maintained by the courts? 10 7 When
do private actors become public servants-when judges officially as-
sign cases to private providers? How do court-approved local rules
intersect with state and bar association drafted regulations? 08 Most
courts have acted as if ADR is the practice of law, certainly when
105. See Murray Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in DAVID LUBAN, THE
GOOD LAWYER (1984) 153-54; Murray Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability
of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 671-73 (1978).
106. See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Con-
stitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 502-03 (1989).
107. Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of ADR, CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1997).
108. Many courts, such as the Northern District of California and Nebraska's federal
courts, to name two examples, have promulgated local rules, which include ethical stan-
dards for third-party neutrals, such as incorporating the conflicts provisions, for third-party
neutrals, of 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988) that judges must follow. How will these rule systems
interact with state ethics rules? For an illuminating discussion of the Erie problems in
federal ethics, see Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum Federal Practice: Ethics and Erie, 9 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHics 89, 97-109 (1995).
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conducted with the imprimatur of the court and indeed, some have
gone so far as to require that mediators must be lawyers. °9
Official judicial and court treatment of ethics and standards issues
does not, of course, exhaust the field. Private providers of ADR serv-
ices, which may include both lawyers and nonlawyers, have begun to
promulgate and adopt their own rules and standards, both within such
organizations as AAA and JAMS-Endispute, and between organiza-
tions.110 It remains unclear what role these private ethical rules and
standards will play in litigated disputes about the quality or ethics of
ADR proceedings."' Throughout the country, many courts are now
facing questions about the ethical and legal limits of private con-
tracting for ADR services where egregious ethics violations have oc-
curred. 12 Thus, courts will inevitably have to scrutinize private efforts
to regulate (or, as it were, deregulate, by seeking pre-dispute contract
waivers) ethics and standards by which ADR services will be
measured.
The current ethics rules and codes are thus both over-inclusive
and over-determined (by requiring zealous conduct where it may be
dysfunctional) and under-inclusive and under-determined (by failing
to deal with new issues or modifications of the "adversary" ideal for
other forms of problem solving). At least one state has sought to deal
with these issues by seeking to connect "exit" rules for attorney-ADR
participants from the Model Rules to coordinate "entrance" rules to
specific ADR ethics concerns that will apply to lawyers and nonlawy-
ers alike." 3 Such efforts seek to craft specific ethical standards that
109. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.106 (West Supp. 1996) (Florida rule for certified and
court appointed mediators); Mattox Hair et al., Ethics Within the Mediation Process, ADR
CURRENTS, Summer 1996, at 9; Moberly, supra note 25, at 719-23.
110. See, e.g., J.A.M.S./ENDIsPuTE, POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS § VI (1996) (stating that a mediator should refrain
from providing legal advice); see also DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND AR-
BITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
(1995) (signed by the American Bar Association, Section on Labor and Employment, Nat'l
Academy of Arbitrators, American Arbitration Assoc., Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, ACLU Workplace Rights Project
and National Employment Lawyers Assoc. at 47 LAB. L. J. 122 (1996).
111. See generally Myron Levin, Caveat: Know Your Arbitrator Law: Two Tales Illus-
trate the Risks in an Increasingly Common Feature of Contracts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1997,
at DI (discussing arbitration ethics abuses, and how private arbitrators rely on pre-dispute
contract waivers of conflicts and interested participation of arbitrators).
112. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 624 (Ct. App.
(1995)) (holding that the evidence did not support trial court's finding of fraud in the arbi-
tration clause of a health plan).
113. See Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court, ADR Review Board, and Minne-
sota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board of the Ethics and Standards Committee of
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are responsive both to the law practice issues and the specific issues
that are implicated in the use of ADR.
Thus, different underlying values and goals of different processes
suggest that it may matter, for the practice itself, whether ADR activi-
ties are assimilated to more conventional forms of adversary prac-
tice1 4 or whether task and role specific guidelines can be developed.
Let's examine some concrete examples.
B. The Integrity of ADR: Of Conflicts, Confidentiality,
and Neutrality
.1. Conflicts of Interest
One of the arenas that has sparked the greatest controversy and
need for regulation has been that of conflicts of interest. While the
lawyer rules of conflicts of interest are intended to protect the inter-
ests of loyalty and confidentiality, conflicts rules may have to serve
different purposes in ADR practices. Although the value of "client
loyalty" is absent when there is no representation, another concern,
that of integrity and trust of the process, may provide new dilemmas.
In the first few cases to test the scope of conflicts of interest, we can
see the tensions of different paradigms of legal practice stretching and
confounding the rules. Courts have had to decide such issues without
clear guidance and have chosen instead to use the Model Rules or the
Judicial Code by analogy. These cases illuminate the multiple layers
of complexity in the conflicts area when it is imported to ADR.
Some analytic clarity may ease our reading of the cases. Unlike
traditional lawyer conflicts (governed by Model Rules 1.7-1.12) that
usually affect representational problems (Rule 1.12 deals with the
transition from judge or arbitrator (but not mediator!)), of time (con-
current or successive representations), and place (moves from one
legal locale to another like law firm to law firm or government to law
firm), conflicts in ADR involve conflicts of role (representation and
neutraling) as well as time and place. Thus, in efforts to mechanically
import the "screen" or "cone of silence" device of Rule 1.11 (screen-
ing former government lawyers from private representation in law
firms) and Rule 1.12 (screening former judges or arbitrators from the
representational work of their subsequent law firms) to ADR, many
the Conflict Management and Dispute Resolution Section of the Minnesota Bar Associa-
tion (Oct. 27, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Report to Minnesota Supreme
Court].
114. Does it matter that the "zealous representation" of Canon 7 has been moved to
the comments of Model Rule 1.3 (now requiring diligence rather than zeal)?
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commentators, lawyers and judges have not fully explored the differ-
ent contexts in which such conflicts can arise.
Consider: In ADR there are the following possible classifications
of conflicts (categorized by time, relatedness of matter, changed role
of third party, and location of professional activity):
Prior (Before ADR):
- Can a third-party neutral mediate or arbitrate in a matter
in which s/he previously arbitrated or mediated one of the same
parties in a different matter or substantially-related matter?
- Can a third-party neutral mediate or arbitrate in a matter
in which s/he previously represented a party in the same or a sub-
stantially related matter?
- Can a third-party neutral mediate or arbitrate in a matter
in which his/her law firm (but not s/he) represented a party?
- Can a law firm take on a representation of a party if that
party previously was party to a mediation or arbitration of some-
one who practices in the law firm?
Concurrent:
- Can a mediator/arbitrator perform neutral services when
one of the parties is currently represented (in a related or differ-
ent matter) by the mediator's law firm?
- Can a law firm take on representation (in a related or dif-
ferent matter) of a client who is currently a party to a mediation/
arbitration conducted by a member of the law firm?
- When, if at all, can/should screens be employed to allow
individuals to provide third-party neutral services where other
members of the law firm provide representation?
- Who is responsible for monitoring conflicts? In a court-
sponsored program, must the court or the third-party neutral con-
duct a conflicts check with the law firm's representational clients
and potential parties to a court-assigned ADR proceeding?
Successive:
- Can a law firm represent (after a mediation or arbitration
is concluded) a party in the same matter, a substantially-related,
or a different matter in which a firm partner mediated the
dispute?
- Can a law firm represent a party adverse to a party in a
concluded mediation or arbitration conducted by a member of
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the law firm? (Can you see what the potential conflict issue is
here?)
Vicarious:
- Under what circumstances can a law firm screen itself off
from the prior, current, or potential future work of a firm mem-
ber who conducts mediation or arbitration services?1 15
Disclosure/Waiver/Consent:
- Which of the above conflicts should be "waivable" if the
client consents to either representation or third-party neutraling,
after full disclosure of potential or actual conflicts?
- When should "waivers" and consent be disallowed
completely?
- When can waivers and consents be withdrawn if new rela-
tionships, creating potential or actual conflicts are created, either
during a representation or during an ADR proceeding?
Thus, conflicts issues implicated in the ADR area involve prior
and current representational and third-party neutral work of the indi-
vidual and the firm, as well as a consideration of potential future
work. 116 Thus, questions of role, time, place and vicarious conflicts
must all be analyzed to consider whether a particular conflict should
be prohibited or can be waived.
As with all potential conflicts of interest, the legal question is
what should be absolutely prohibited to protect some important inter-
est (like loyalty, confidentiality or integrity of the process) and what
conflicts can comfortably and permissibly be waived by full disclosure
and consent? Some commentators have suggested simple solutions to
these problems by providing for strong and broad disclosure require-
115. For the most part, screens are currently not authorized by law in these situations.
The Model Rules allow screens only in cases of government to private law firm moves
under Rule 1.11; however the current draft of the Restatement § 204 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, Mar. 29, 1996) and case law throughout the country, at both federal and state levels,
have allowed the screen device to be used in other conflict situations (such as lateral pri-
vate law firm moves).
116. The most controversial and practical aspects of the issues about conflicts have to
do with the fear of some court managers of ADR that distinguished third-party neutrals
(particularly volunteers from major law firms or those with great expertise) will have to
decline ADR practice when such work might disqualify their law firm from on-going or
future work for particular clients. This has already occurred in the areas of intellectual
property specialties, insurance defense, and repeat play, and when court ordered ADR is
applied to major corporations who transact diverse business in large metropolitan areas
(and thus, may be employing a variety of law firms for different kinds of legal work).
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ments with specific waiver and consent provisions. Others simply sug-
gest an arbitrary time period for ADR conflicts to "lapse.""' 7
In the ADR context, these possible solutions may have other
complications-what is to be disclosed? The judicial conflict rules1 18
focus on personal relationships and financial interests. But, might an
ADR provider have to disclose other factors as well, such as the qual-
ity and amount of prior work for the parties (as advocated by oppo-
nents of pre-dispute contract allocation of arbitration or mediation
services to particular providers), or potential or "perceived" biases or
prejudices such as personal, demographic and social affiliations." 9
Several of the few recent cases which have had to address these
issues illustrate some of the difficulties. In Poly Software International,
Inc. v. Su,12° a federal court disqualified an attorney from representing
a party against another party who had been a co-participant in a previ-
ous mediation involving a similar issue. In the first case, the two par-
ties (together) were accused of appropriating software from another
company and the attorney involved in the second case was the media-
tor. During the mediation the mediator clearly had access to informa-
tion from all parties, including in all likelihood, some information
about who had actually been responsible for the "theft" of the
software codes. In the second case, the former partners in the prior
mediation were engaged in a similar dispute, this time one of them
accusing the other of appropriating the software documentation. The
court based its disqualification ruling by reasoning, by analogy, from
Rule 1.9,121 that like an attorney "who has formerly represented a cli-
ent in a matter [and who should therefore] not thereafter represent an-
other person in the same or substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
117., See generally CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CPR PRACrICE GUIDE:
MEDIATION (1995) (suggesting a six month time bar for work on a substantially related
matter).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1993).
119. See Baruch Bush, supra note 3, at 38-40 (discussing personal reactions to parties
or their issues, and when "group" or class relationships exist); cf. Homer C. La Rue, The
Ethics of Disclosures by Arbitrators of Color: Have the Rules Changed?, 42 LAB. L.J. 619,
629-34 (1991) (arguing that third-party neutrals of "minority" status are expected to dis-
close and disqualify themselves more often than whites on grounds of demographic or
social affiliations). For a similar issue in the formal justice system see Motion to Recuse
Judge Leon Higginbotham in Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Oper. Eng'rs, 388
F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974); see also Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying recusal of Judge Constance Baker Motley in employment dis-
crimination claim because of former civil rights litigation).
120. 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah. 1995).
121. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.9 (1995).
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client,"'22 a mediator should not represent someone who had previ-
ously been a party in a mediation. 2 3 Note that the court treated the
prior mediation as being analogous to a prior representation, when
what occurred functionally, was the learning of confidential informa-
tion during the mediation which could have been used adversely
against one of the parties (who had, at least during the mediation,
trusted that the mediator would not only keep the information confi-
dential but not use it against him).
This case is instructive for many reasons. First, it is not clear from
the confidentiality "oaths" and contracts that mediators make, that
they are offering the same protections as representative lawyers. The
mediator in this case could have represented the party in the second
matter without disclosing. any information-all he had to do was
"use"124 what he had learned against the prior party in some way, such
as a tough cross-examination question during a deposition, a subtle
"threat" through a settlement offer or any number of devices which
would have communicated to the adverse party that he would be held
liable "when the real facts came out." There is no need for disclosure
to a third party here. Thus, the court, in a sense, imposed a require-
ment of integrity for the "long-term" trust of the mediation process by
suggesting that the mediator was no freer to use information than a
prior representative who owes a "continuing loyalty" to the previous
client. [25
I agree with this result but it is important to note that the under-
lying values supporting the holding are different for mediation and
representational work. It is not "loyalty" to the party that needs to be
protected in mediation (indeed, impartiality and neutrality values 26
dictate a certain distance from the parties) but the integrity of the
process. If a party thought that a mediator could use shared informa-
tion against him he would likely never participate in the mediation.
This value, which looks both easy to apply and similar to client loyalty
concerns, in focusing retrospectively, becomes more difficult when ap-
plied prospectively. Consider what the mediator or representational
lawyer has to consider when deciding if "future" representational or
neutraling work might be precluded by a current assignment. Cur-
122. Poly Software Int'l, Inc., 880 F. Supp. at 1494.
123. Id.
124. Note that Rule 1.9, dealing with conflicts of interest in representation of former
clients, prohibits both the disclosure and the "use" of information obtained in a prior rep-
resentation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (c)(1)-(2) (1995).
125. Id.
126. See Maute, supra note 63, at 508-19; Riskin, supra note 88, at 343.
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rently, some firms consider whether or not to take some third party
neutraling work that might prevent future, more lucrative, representa-
tional work.
Also consider the interesting fact in Poly Software, that the rea-
son the mediator was in demand as a representational advocate was
that he was one of the most knowledgeable and experienced intellec-
tual property lawyers available in the geographic area. 127 Thus, if
mediators look forward to consider all of the possible representational
work they will lose if they accept a particular mediation in their field
of expertise, it is likely they will want to decline at least one or the
other (and so far, most specialized lawyers find their representational
work more lucrative than third-party neutraling). Thus, if the integ-
rity of the process or a similar value like "avoiding the appearance of
impropriety," is taken too seriously, it will prevent a mediator from
subsequent representation either for or "against" a party who ap-
peared in a mediation (whether in a related or unrelated matter,
though some might argue to limit such a rule to a "substantially re-
lated matter.") This will likely (it already has in some districts) have a
chilling effect on the willingness of some, especially specialized and
expert attorneys, to perform mediational roles.
Add to these issues the disqualification of the entire firm (under
Rule 1.10), which the Poly Software court ordered, 28 and mediation
work will soon be considered anathema in some quarters. In an effort
to suggest that a "screen" might work appropriately here, some com-
mentators have suggested that the courts recognize, that unlike repre-
sentational lawyers, those serving as mediators cannot be presumed to
share information with their partners. A mediator promises the par-
ties confidentiality, and that is presumed to apply to anyone outside of
the mediation. 29 Thus, if the screen is to be used in any situation, it
would appear that a mediator, promising not to reveal any informa-
tion, would be a perfect candidate for screening, allowing others in the
firm to take on what otherwise would be prohibited representation. 130
Note that this conflates the two underlying values of conflicts
protections-the protection of confidentiality, which can be realized
127. See Poly Software Int'l, Inc., 880 F. Supp. at 1495.
128. Id.
129. Indeed, the Florida Advisory Committee on Ethics in ADR has ruled explicitly on
the terms under which parties may seek expert guidance outside of the mediation (of
spouses, accountants and others) while still preserving confidence. See Hair et al., supra
note 109, at 10.
130. See James E. McGuire, Conflicts in Subsequent Representation, Disp. RESOL.
MAG., Spring 1996, at 4.
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with a "screen,"13' and the "integrity" or "propriety" of the process
which cannot. If we decide that it looks bad, or impairs the overall
trust of mediation if a mediator may subsequently represent someone
against a party in mediation (as many have advocated, at least with
respect to an unrelated matter), then the screen may not work in this
context. Consider how it appears, both to the former party (and now
adversary), and the general public that a "neutral" or his law firm is
now litigating against a party he "helped" to reach a negotiated settle-
ment as a neutral. Does the "unseemliness" of this change of roles
require regulation in the form of prohibition (for the general public
and legitimacy of the process) or possible consent (for the "waivable"
protection of the parties)? I do not aim to resolve these questions
today. My point is simply that the lawyer's conflicts rules do not con-
sider all the same concerns and issues that are involved in mediation
with respect to representation conflicts (or its converse, prior repre-
sentation to mediation132).
131. Query: Can such confidentiality be assumed? I am skeptical that mediators do
not in fact seek guidance from, and share information with, law firm members (not to
mention associates, paralegals, and legal assistants who may work on the mediated case in
the firm).
132. I do think this situation is more easily dealt with by mutual party consent. In a
recent case the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held (under the more stringent review stan-
dards of the Federal Arbitration Act for overturning an arbitration award) that prior rep-
resentation of a mediator-arbitrators' law firm (apparently unknown and therefore
undisclosed by him) of a party in an unrelated matter did not disqualify the arbitrator or
void the arbitration award on ground of "evident partiality" under the FAA. See AI-Harbi
v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This case still raises questions about whether
standards should be different for arbitration than mediation, given the statutory standards
of the FAA for overturning awards and by what standards parties and third party neutrals
should be held for investigating possible conflicts. The court held that it could find no
source for a generalized duty of investigation of conflicts like those in this situation. Id. at
682. The court distinguished a Ninth Circuit ruling that did reverse an arbitration award
where, under the special rules of NASD arbitration, there was a duty to investigate con-
flicts of prior unrelated representation, at least so they could be disclosed and considered
by the parties. Id. at 682-83. The D.C. Circuit, in looking at actual impartiality seemed to
conclude that if the mediator-arbitrator did not know of the representation himself, he
could not have been biased by it. Id. at 683. Query how we are to consider the underlying
factual conclusion that the mediator-arbitrator did not know-how is his credibility to be
assessed? In a concurring opinion, Judge Silberman opined that since the parties chose the
arbitrator it was their obligation to do the conflicts checks. (Query, how could they have
searched a law firm's confidential client data base?) Note that in this case, we have the
added fact of the arbitrator's terminated relationship with the prior law firm (a reversal, in
a sense of the "screen" solution). Note as well, that whether for strategic reasons or not,
one party (here after the fact) considered it inappropriate that their decision-maker should
come from a firm that had previously represented its opponent.
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In another case, Cho v. Superior Court,133 the court disqualified
an entire law firm under the imputed disqualification rules 134 when a
judge, upon retirement, joined the law firm which represented a party
in a matter in which he attempted settlement, using mediational like
techniques. In this case, the firm's efforts to use the screen permitted
by Rule 1.12 for former judges and arbitrators was rejected (correctly
in my view) because the judge had learned confidential facts concern-
ing both sides during settlement negotiations and was not acting with
arms-length distance from the parties usually associated with judging
or arbitrating. 135 Thus, although some commentators suggest that
screening would work here because the judge promised confidentiality
to all, could easily be screened, and shouldn't be discussing this case
with his partners anyway, 136 I share the court's view that this is pre-
cisely a case where a conflict is clear, and inappropriate representation
would occur for several reasons.
First, the court recognized that settlement functions and media-
tion functions are different from adjudicative functions and the judge
did, in all likelihood, hear "private" or "settlement" facts that could
be used adversely by his firm against its adversary if any of the infor-
mation were to become known. But, in addition, even if the judge
could be trusted to keep his confidentiality pledge, there is a concern
for the integrity of settlement and mediational processes if the parties
see that their settlement officer (judicial or otherwise) has now joined
their litigation "enemy."'1 37 There is then, a concern for the integrity
of ADR processes (settlement conferences, mediation, even early
neutral evaluation) that has more to do with "the appearance of pro-
priety" and fairness (in a real sense) than with the functional analysis
of confidentiality and relatedness commonly employed in the repre-
sentational context.
To summarize, these early cases beginning to deal with the com-
plexities of conflicts in the practice of ADR, reveal that while analo-
gies to the lawyer rules may aid decision-making, eventually courts
will likely have to grapple with the fact that the underlying principles
of lawyer representational conflicts rules do not necessarily match
133. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863,863-64 (Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 1996 Cal. LEXIS 770
(Cal. Jan. 31, 1996).
134. CALIFORNIA RULES PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ch. 3, § 3-310 (West 1997).
135. Cho, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867-68, 871.
136. Note here that third-party neutrals working in law firm contexts will often have
assistance on their cases from associates who may "cross the line" to the litigation side.
This is why screens (of layers of lawyers) may be difficult to administer in the ADR
context.
137. Cho, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870.
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those of third-party neutrals, especially where, as in Cho and Al-Harbi
particular individuals switch roles138 (as well as allegiances to parties).
It is possible that solutions can be found based on broad duties of
investigation and disclosure of possible conflicts which the parties can
waive, 139 at least at the beginning of an ADR or representation. Or,
we might have to recognize (as some have suggested in the lawyer
conflicts area), that with our increasingly mobile legal profession, the
conflicts rules themselves will have to change,14 ° permitting either
greater "free agency" 141 or at least specific time cut-offs for conflicts.
138. From settlement judge to law firm member and from law firm member to media-
tor and arbitrator in these instances. Id.; Al-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 681.
139. Of course, as the AI-Harbi case illustrates, it is easier to talk about waiver at the
beginning of the case, then when a losing party "subsequently" discovers that something
has not been disclosed and uses it to seek reversal of an award or agreement. Al-Harbi, 85
F.3d at 681-82. One of the key difficulties in the conflicts area is its dynamic quality. Law
firms take on new clients continuously and the duty to investigate and disclose, if on-going,
can lead to disqualification in the middle of a case, after great expense to the parties.
Managers of law firm conflicts committees informally report that they spend many hours
(of billable time) on conflicts checks. Personal communication with Leonard Gilbert, Esq.,
Florida (Oct. 11, 1996).
140. One could contrast the stringent conflicts rules of our American system with those
of English barristers and lawyers sharing offices in a wide variety of other legal cultures. In
many other legal cultures lawyers are considered representatives of "the case" not the
client and side-switching or subsequent representation or service of adverse interests is far
more common. These issues have significance for the increasing globalization of the prac-
tice of both law and ADR. See generally DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 56 (discussing
international arbitration and transnational legal issues); Richard L. Abel, Transnational
Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 737 (1994) (discussing the patterns and growth of
international law practice); David Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies
of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994) (discussing the role of lawyers in global economic and
political systems). Why are American "conflicts" rules and loyalty principles so significant,
especially in a culture generally known for its lack of "loyalty" in economic enterprises
more generally. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND
THE CREATION OF POSTERITY (1995) (discussing the irony of different approaches to
"trust" and role in cultures).
141. At least one practicing lawyer has suggested to me that conflicts rules, with appro-
priate consent and waiver should be calibrated to "the sophistication of the client." Major
corporations with inside counsel know what they are "waiving" when they choose a law
firm that has previously represented or mediated with an adversary. They just want to hire
that law firm because of its "quality" or expertise in a particular area. Such a broad client-
determined consent rule adopts a "market control" approach to legal ethics. Query
whether the conflicts rules should permit consent when the purposes are not only client
protection (the consent model of dispute resolution I argued for in Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 13, at 2690, 2692, 2693-94), but system integrity and "appearance of impropriety"
concerns for how the "process" looks to those outside of the dispute (the "public" or the
"externalities" problem of dispute resolution raised by Luban, supra note 22, at 2622-23).
To the extent that there are interest groups in the conflicts discussion, one can see the
replication of divisions of "academic-moralists" and "practitioner-pragmatists" which have
characterized many of the debates around ethical standards for the legal profession. See
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As a strict conflicts enforcer in some areas142 1 am skeptical that "sim-
ple" rules can be found, but I am certain that if we are more explicit
about the underlying concerns (integrity of the process, as well as con-
fidentiality for the parties) we can develop some guidelines and sug-
gestions for good practices.
2. Confidentiality
Like our concerns about conflicts of interest, confidentiality in
ADR has become increasingly complex and controversial over the
years. In seeking to draft ethics rules or guidelines of appropriate pro-
tection in this area, one must be mindful once again, of where ADR
practice may diverge from representation practice. As the Model
Rules (Rule 1.6) seek to protect both client and attorney interests,'143
in ADR there are party interests, as well as third-party neutral and
process interests. Thus, as with representational confidentiality, there
are multiple sources of law in the confidentiality area, including party
contracts and agreements, specific statutory codes and sections, 1'"
court rules, case law and ethics rules. What is particularly tricky in the
ADR area is ascertaining exactly what is protected. Under represen-
tational confidentiality rules, by definition, anything said in a media-
tion would not be confidential because (at least in joint sessions),
adverse parties are revealing information to each other and in the
presence of a third party (the neutral) and are thus, outside the pro-
tected zone of lawyer-client confidentiality. Thus, ADR has had to
forge its own confidentiality protections so that parties may share
"settlement" and other potentially compromising facts with each
other without fear that such information will be used outside of the
mediation. Interestingly, issues have already developed about the
generally Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the
1908 Canons (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
142. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 1189-98.
143. And thus, ethics protections for confidentiality must always be distinguished from
the evidentiary privilege which rests on some different grounds, with different exceptions
in different jurisdictions. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception
to Confidentiality: Restating Law Without the Was, The Will Be or the Ought To Be, 29 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1631 (1996) (discussing the current effort to draft the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers and its changes in confidentiality and disclosure requirements); Fred C.
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351 (1989) (discussing the basis,
effect, and future of confidentiality rules).
144. See generally FED. R. EVID. 408; NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, ME.
DIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE ch. 9 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the different barriers
protecting confidential disclosure in the mediation process); Eric D. Green, A Heretical
View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 (1986) (identifying the
various situations in which claims of mediation confidentiality may arise and describing the
current state of the law of mediation confidentiality).
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subsequent use of information disclosed in an unsuccessful mediation,
where at least one party seeks admission of such information in formal
court proceedings. 145 Though some have argued that all information
disclosed in ADR proceedings should be covered by evidentiary rules
that protect against admission of disclosures in furtherance of settle-
ment, 46 this is considered by others a risky business as many other
disclosure statutes "trump" confidentiality provisions and require dis-
closure of facts of child or domestic abuse or other intentions to com-
mit crimes.' 47
Ethics rules and guidelines, as well as private contracts and agree-
ments for confidentiality, are still subject to "other law," raising signif-
icant issues about what Miranda warnings parties may need in a
mediation in determining whether to be totally candid, as requested
by the "norms" of good mediation practice.
Third-party neutrals have their own (and sometimes different
from the parties') concerns about confidentiality, once again appeal-
ing to the integrity of the process and their own role-based ethics.
Mediators and arbitrators promise confidentiality (in their contracts,
retainer agreements and through private ethics codes) and may go so
far as to risk contempt proceedings in refusing to disclose information
revealed in a mediation or arbitration, even when under subpoena.
148
This is because, whatever the conflicting interests in particular cases
(including allegations of fraud of either the parties or the third party
neutral), third-party neutrals have their personal integrity and reputa-
tion for confidentiality at stake. Thus, while ethics standards attempt
to deal broadly with confidentiality issues,' 49 the reality is that case
law and common law development will be required to deal with the
myriad of factually specific conflicts that exist between competing
policies. 5 °
145. See, e.g., GTE Directories Serv. Corp. v. Pacific Bell Directory, 135 F.R.D. 187,
190-91 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (requiring parties in future cases to submit documents with objec-
tions during ENE proceedings, otherwise privileges assumed waived).
146. See Green, supra note 144, at 35 (arguing for minor modifications to present rules
rather than blanket protection).
147. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11164 (West 1992) (known as the Child Abuse and
Neglect Reporting Act requiring child abuse to be reported and affecting the confidential-
ity of such reports).
148. Reginald Alleyne, Delawyering Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L. J. 93 (1989).
149. See John D. Feerick, Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 79 JUDICATURE 314, 316
(1996) ("Confidentiality: a mediator shall maintain the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties with regard to confidentiality.").
150. See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988)
(discussing conflicts about confidentiality at the macro level). In Cincinnati Gas a newspa-
per sought entrance to a "confidential" summary jury trial proceeding claiming an impor-
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Confidentiality is one of several of such basic issues to the integ-
rity of the ADR process that it is not easily assimilated to confidenti-
ality in adversary practice. As confidentiality attaches to lawyer-client
interactions which meet certain basic requirements, confidentiality, at
least in the mediation context, is far more complex. With a wide range
of practices concerning when to hold private caucuses and separate
sessions with the parties,'151 attempts to clarify party expectations of
confidentiality will be difficult at best, especially with such variations
in third-party neutral practice. Some mediators reserve the right to
share information between caucuses where it is "their" judgment that
such disclosure will serve the settlement well; others promise never to
disclose unless authorized to do so by the parties. 152 Most problem-
atic in practice, is the unwitting revelation of some underlying factual
detail or party preference that can be discerned by a wise party when
a neutral "proposes" a possible settlement option that implicitly con-
tains messages about the preferences or facts of the other party. (Is
this a violation of confidentiality? How should it be enforced or po-
liced?) Such issues cannot be resolved easily either by broad protec-
tions of confidentiality or by reference to the lawyers' (and even other
professionals"1 53) duties of confidentiality.
3. Neutrality
Like conflicts and confidentiality, neutrality or impartiality of the
third-party neutral showcases the different philosophies of practice
(differences among third-party neutrals and differences from adver-
sary practice). While some have argued that mediators and arbitra-
tors should always be distanced, unbiased, impartial and neutral, at
least three separate arguments have been made for some departures
from that seemingly clear ADR norm. First, as parties seek substan-
tive expertise (such as in intellectual property and environmental dis-
putes) or knowledge of the parties or their history together (labor
tant public interest was at stake. Id. at 902. The court ruled that summary jury trials, as
settlement proceedings, were private and confidential and denied admission to the press.
Id. at 90445.
151. Compare GARY FRIEDMAN, A GUIDE TO DIVORCE MEDIATION (1993) (admon-
ishing separate meetings with the parties) with JAMES C. FREUND, THE NEUTRAL NEGOTI-
ATOR: WHY AND How MEDIATION CAN WoRK TO RESOLVE DOLLAR DISPUTES (1994)
(suggesting mediation be conducted almost exclusively in separate sessions).
152. This is similar to the divergence in mediator-evaluator practice as to whether
"evaluations" should be given in joint or separate sessions. See Aaron, supra note 10, at
285-87.
153. Are psychologist-mediators bound by the requirements of Tarasoff where others
are not?
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arbitrators' knowledge of the shop-floor), the expertise of "repeat
players" or contract arbitrators (as in collective bargaining agree-
ments) may lead to the phenomenon of the "wise elder" who may be
enmeshed with, or at least known to the parties. Second, as some
have advocated that third-party neutrals may need to utilize particular
"power balancing" techniques (such as giving legal advice to an un-
represented party) to reduce inequalities in the mediation process,
momentary "neutrality" may be exchanged for "fairness" concerns
about the overall process. Third, where some mediators insist on
withholding approval of an unfair or "unlawful" settlement, the neu-
tral's role may be transformed from simple facilitator to "judge" of
the parties' agreement.
Such variations in the description of the neutral's function, thus,
makes inapplicable much of the Judicial Code of Conduct's rules for
third parties and makes fashioning a clear set of standards for neutrals
extremely problematic, that is, unless one adopts a particular version
of the appropriate role for the third-party neutral.5 4 Many mediators
(and some arbitrators) would disclaim rigid adherence to one role def-
inition or another. Good third-party neutrals vary their practices flex-
ibly to deal with the contexts of the disputes' 55 and know "when to
hold them and when to fold them."''
Thus, conflicts, confidentiality and neutrality, as three of the most
significant ethical dilemmas faced by practitioners of ADR, demon-
strate how we must consider the underlying values which inform the
practice differences before we can easily assimilate ADR to lawyers'
ethics. If it is not only the parties' interests, but the integrity or inter-
ests of the processes themselves which are at issue, practitioners of
ADR will have to craft their own rules and standards to meet the
variable needs and requirements of the parties and those of process
integrity. Perhaps honest disclosure of practice differences will be
enough, but it may be possible to develop practice-differentiated "best
practices" models that do not necessarily require adherence to a par-
ticular mediation philosophy. At this point in the development of the
field, simple descriptions and disclosures of practice variations in a
"best practices" format may better serve the needs of the parties in
making informed choices about process than a rigid set of "ethical
rules" or standards.
154. See Susan Silbey & Sally Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAw & POL'Y Q.
7, 8-11 (1986) (specifying the empirical variations in mediator approaches).
155. See generally DEBORAH KOLB, WHEN TALK WORKS (1994) (discussing mediator
profiles and the contextual variation and flexibility of effective mediators).
156. My apologies to Kenny Rogers and "The Gambler."
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C. Practice Issues: Ethics and Standards for the Regulation of
Practice: Of Fees, Solicitation, and Joint Practices
While I will not canvass the full range of possible "practice" is-
sues that are usually dealt with in professional codes, it may be useful
to consider at least some of the issues which demonstrate once again
that ADR practice diverges in important respects from traditional
legal practice. At least one state has already begun consideration,
through a rule by rule analysis, of how the lawyers' Model Rules of
Professional Conduct do not deal with all of the issues of ADR and
has recommended that a "coordinate" code, using the same rule num-
bers should be developed to deal with such ADR practice issues as
Competence,157 Scope of Representation, 58 Diligence, 59 Fees,16 °
Confidentiality of Information, 161 Conflicts of Interest,162 Organiza-
tional Client Duties,163 Parties with Disabilities, 64 Safekeeping Prop-
erty,165 Declining Representation, 66 Truthfulness, 67 Dealing with
Unrepresented Parties, 6 8 Communicating About Services,' 69 Adver-
tising, 170 Contacts with Prospective Clients,' 7 ' Communications
About Fields of Practice, 72 Firm Names, 73 Judicial and Legal Offi-
cials, 74 Reporting Professional Misconduct, 75 Misconduct, 76 and Ju-
157. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1995).
158. See id. Rule 1.2.
159. See id. Rule 1.3.
160. See id. Rule 1.5.
161. See id. Rule 1.6.
162. See id. Rules 1.7-1.12.
163. See id. Rule 1.13.
164. See id. Rule 1.14.
165. See id. Rule 1.15.
166. See id. Rule 1.16.
167. See id. Rule 4.1. Note that this listing eliminates all of the "adversary representa-
tion" rules of Rule 3. I would include consideration of analogies to these rules, such as
Rule 3.3 Candor toward the Tribunal. Many of the Rule 3 requirements will have particu-
lar applicability to court-annexed forms of ADR in which ADR proceedings may well take
place in the courthouse, before a "tribunal" and represent the difficult hybrid situations of
public and private disputing institutions. We will have to consider the claims of Lon Fuller
that each dispute institution has its own philosophical justification, purpose, and defense.
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITy OF LAW 180 (1964). Does it? What if the institutions
are hybrids of public and private, adversarial and non-adversarial, coerced and consented
to?
168. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (1995).
169. See id. Rule 7.1.
170. See id. Rule 7.2.
171. See id Rule 7.3.
172. See id. Rule 7.4.
173. See id. Rule 7.5.
174. See id. Rule 8.2.
175. See id. Rule 8.3.
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risdiction.1' 7 Note that this extensive list leaves out a number of other
rules that clearly could have relevance to ADR practice. Rule 2 deals
with the lawyer as counselor (and clearly has relevance for the lawyer
who serves as an evaluator, predictor or advice-giver in a mediation,
with special difficulties if one party is unrepresented 178). Article 3,
dealing with the rules of advocacy, clearly has relevance (even if it
needs to be modified) for the representative within a mediation or
arbitration. Article 5, with its rules about internal organizational su-
pervisory responsibilities and Rule 5.5's admonitions about unauthor-
ized practice of law (or ADR!) would clearly be appropriate in any
comprehensive effort to develop a coordinate code. Finally, Articles 6
(Public Service) and 8 (Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession)
would clearly also have applicability to the entire ADR "profession"
(third-party neutrals, as well as advocates). Thus, the effort to de-
velop a coordinate code, though it might provide more ease of draft-
ing and administration, will still have to confront, in all of its
particulars, the concrete ways in which ADR may differ from adver-
sary practice and conventional attorney practice rules.
Let me illustrate with a few examples. Although contingent fees
are permissible in some forms of adversarial practice (generally pro-
hibited in criminal cases and divorce), some have suggested that con-
tingent fees should be absolutely prohibited in ADR practice. To the
extent that mediators have an "interest" in settling a dispute, settle-
ment, rather than what is fair or just, may become the mediator's goal
and parties may not be fully apprised of the consequences of their
conclusions, and "consent" to settlement may not be real. Such
prohibitions on contingent fees have been proposed in ADR, though
it is well known that some mediators take a percentage of the settle-
ment, either as a straight fee or as a "bonus" if settlement is
achieved. 17
9
In the area of solicitation, it is now clear that many ADR provid-
ers, both individuals and organizations, seek to have themselves ap-
pointed as the contractual third-party neutral for clients who contract
in advance for a wide range of goods and services. What kind of solic-
176. See id. Rule 8.4.
177. See id. Rule 8.5; Report to Minnesota Supreme Court, supra note 113, at 10.
178. The issue of the appropriateness of ADR with unrepresented parties is itself a
major "ethical" issue about which many courts and individual practitioners have differed.
Some courts prohibit the use of ADR in cases with pro se litigants. Other courts are exper-
imenting with the use of ADR in prisoners' civil cases, civil rights cases, and in some bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
179. Kenneth Feinberg is one such third-party neutral who acknowledges he is some-
times paid this way.
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itation should be prohibited? Should pre-contractual assignments of
particular neutrals itself be prohibited, as has been suggested by some
consumer groups and representatives of employee-litigants? As the
specter of First Amendment jurisprudence questioning the regulation
of professional solicitation efforts looms over lawyers and ADR, what
limits on client solicitation (including courts as "clients" of ADR
providers) will be permitted?180
Of great importance to ADR practitioners is consideration of the
unauthorized practice of law. While I have already discussed the diffi-
cult question of whether ADR practice is itself the practice of law,
here I am concerned with the common and useful practice of engaging
a variety of ADR professionals (including psychologists, economists,
accountants and social workers) in joint practice of dispute settlement
(or the sole practice of nonlawyers in matters containing legal issues
such as divorce and domestic relations cases or corporate valuations).
Clearly, a non-adversarial, multi-disciplinary approach to problem-
solving should encourage such use of diverse expertise in dispute reso-
lution; but here, both the current set of lawyer ethics codes and
whatever rules or standards we develop for ADR must explicitly deal
with such practices. 181 If problem solving is to be broadly conceived,
borrowing from and utilizing the knowledge of many disciplines, than
a limiting no "unauthorized practice of law" rule or fee splitting
prohibitions will inhibit the development of multi-disciplinary prob-
lem solving.
Finally, regulating practice routines by ethics standards begs the
question of the appropriate unit of analysis. While some have at-
tempted to develop standards for particular organizational and institu-
tional uses of ADR' s and others for individuals, any regulation of
ethics and standards in ADR will have to confront the issues impli-
cated in provider accountability, internal ethics and responsibility.
83
180. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371,2381 (1995) (holding that
a 30-day ban on direct mail solicitation for personal injury attorneys is a constitutionally
permissible regulation of commercial speech).
181. This raises the important issue of whether transdisciplinary multi-professional
codes can be developed. Does this suggest that ADR is its own profession or that it is too
early to describe the content of an ADR-specific professional code? How can multiple
professional disciplinary codes interface with each other?
182. See CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETILEMENT AND THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN-
ISTRATION, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS
(1994) (on file with author).
183. See generally Theodore Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms, 77 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1 (1991) (describing one example of how to apply group or organizational
responsibility in the lawyer context). The CPR Commission on Ethics and Standards has
separate working groups which will be exploring ethics for Provider groups, such as disclo-
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To what extent should institutions be "accountable" for the conse-
quences of ADR that occur within their aegis-either by referral (as
in the case of courts) or because an institutional provider actually pro-
vides the services, and thus in some way, should take responsibility for
the selection and quality of the services it provides.184 These "institu-
tional" ethics issues will likely be dealt with, if not through ethics and
standards regulation, then by liability and malpractice disputes.8 5
IV. JUSTICE AND ADR: WHERE ETHICS RULES AND STANDARDS
CAN'T GUIDE US-OR CAN THEY?
Perhaps the most vexing and difficult "ethical" issues to resolve in
ADR practice have to do with the tension between dispute resolution
goals (some consider it peace or harmony186) and justice goals. Vast
literature 187 now explores whether the goals of settlement.and justice
are compatible. While I do not want to repeat my general views on
this subject here-in my view, since settlement processes and ADR
are here to stay in both public and private settings, I. am interested in
exploring the question of what ethical standards. or requirements
might be useful in promoting the most fair or just system possible.
The issues involved here include ADR neutral accountability for out-
comes achieved (which in the eyes of some at least, implicates some
loss of "neutrality" for the third party188), the role of the neutral in
sure issues (of organizational, as well as individual conflicts), quality control assurances,
liability, etc.
184. See also SPIDR COMMISSION ON QUALIFICATIONS, QUALIFYING NEUTRALS: THE
BASIC PRINCIPLES (1989) (on file with author); SPIDR COMMISSION ON QUALIFICATIONS,
ENSURING COMPETENCE AND QUALITY IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE (1995) (on file
with author); see generally Donald Weckstein, Mediator Certification: Why and How, 30
U.S.F. L. REV. 757 (1996) (arguing for the role of "certifying entities" to ensure quality
control in mediator certification).
185. Thus far, most organizations have been successful at resisting organizational liabil-
ity. See, e.g., Olson v. American Arbitrator Ass'n, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 850, 852 (N.D. Tex.
1995) (dismissing suit against AAA in Texas for biased arbitrators); Engalla v. Kaiser
Permanente Med. Group, 43. Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 624 (Ct. App. 1995). However, I predict
this will not last as more providers get into the field or as the providers become so large
they cannot adequately "regulate" or vouch for their members.
186. See Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the.Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pac-
ification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 4
(1993).
187. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 2663-65; Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 2, at 1 n.7.
188. See Maute, supra note 63, at 514-15 (suggesting that neutrality standards are re-
laxed in order to meet public accountability and justice standards, and proposes a new
Rule 2.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to specify duties of lawyer mediators,
including a duty of advice-giving to unrepresented parties and a duty to consider the likely
"litigated outcome" as a measure of the mediation outcome's "fairness"). There are also
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correcting "power imbalances" (or in other words, neutral accounta-
bility for the process), the degree to which, for the parties, both
processes and outcomes are in fact freely chosen (invoking in various
formulations, informed consent to both process and outcome, and
"self-determination" or lack of coercion and abuse in the process),
which implicate the behavior of all participants to an ADR proceed-
ing-the parties, their representatives and the neutral. These con-
cerns are "internal" to the process, essentially reducible to the
question of whether a particular ADR proceeding is fair and just for
the parties within it.
The larger jurisprudential debates about ADR implicate institu-
tional ethics and standards-when should one institution (litigation or
ADR) be used over another, for considerations that go beyond the
needs, or wishes of the parties189 -a question framed by Lon Fuller, 190
among others,191 about the particular issue of whether the public has
an interest in private dispute settlement. In other words, the ethics of
ADR have externalities (those outside of a particular ADR proceed-
ing are affected by what goes on inside).
The larger macro justice issues do not lend themselves easily to
rule or standard drafting and are more likely to be debated in the halls
of Congress (considering the renewal of the Civil Justice Reform Act
and its appropriations), in the pages of law reviews like this one, and
eventually, in the case law which will have to consider the larger jus-
tice issues implicated in particular settlements. 192
others who have argued that "internal" fairness should be measured by reference to legal
results. See Robert Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Law-
yer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 41 n.118 (1992); Luban, supra note 22, at
2621; Nolan-Haley, supra note 14, at 84-85. I have argued that there may be "justice," but
that it is different from "legal justice" where a general rule may be inadequate for the
particular situation of the parties. Other concerns, like social, psychological, economic,
moral, religious, or political factors may "trump" legal considerations in a particular case, a
concern recognized by the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7
(1983). For some of us, ADR presents an opportunity to craft individualized solutions in
particular cases and to avoid, occasionally, the injustice of particular legal rules. Those
who favor "law based" or adjudicatory solutions should examine more closely the actual
embodiments of adjudication-who is deciding and interpreting the law for whose inter-
ests? Are law-based solutions always more just? See generally Luban, supra note 22 (argu-
ing for principled settlement and public scrutiny of the settlement result).
189. For one version of this recent debate about the public accountability and lawmak-
ing function of private disputes see Luban, supra note 22, at 2620; Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 13, at 2666-67.
190. See Fuller, supra note 37, at 662.
191. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 47, at 1081-82.
192. See, e.g., Georgine v. AmChem, 83 F.3d 610, 617, 630-31 (3d Cir. 1996) (rejecting
a major class action settlement, borrowing some forms of ADR for settlement of a national
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I do think that ethics considerations, as "aspirations" can be
framed to address both "internal" and "external" justice issues, but
they will be controversial and virtually every formulation presents
problems. I do not think we are ready, however, for clear rules and
standards on some of these issues and will have to await a greater
sample of data (in actual cases) to explore some of the parameters of
regulation. Thus far, most of the proposed standards or rules in this
broad area contain too many ambiguities to be useful. Thus, while I
am prepared to consider concrete formulations for some specific
ADR "ethics" issues, like conflicts and fees, I am less ready to codify
rules and standards of an alternative "justice" system that is just be-
ginning to explore both its strengths and its weaknesses.
Judith Maute, for example, suggests that agreements should only
be "approved" when they either reflect a "possible" legal outcome' 93
or it is clear the parties knowingly and voluntarily departed from such
a possible outcome. In my view, this simply assimilates ADR to the
same goals as adjudication. Larry Susskind argues that the mediator
is responsible, not only to the parties, but to third parties who may be
affected by a mediated resolution of a public policy or community ori-
ented dispute or resource allocation. 194 I have suggested,195 that is-
sues affecting "public" interests should be treated differently than
purely private disputes. Others have argued that unrepresented par-
ties are owed special duties with concomitant increased responsibili-
ties for neutrals in such cases.' 96 Some have suggested standards or
class of asbestos claims against 20 producers and their insurers), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 379
(1996).
193. Some courts will overturn an arbitration award "in manifest disregard of the law,"
but this minority standard for overturning arbitral awards is not favored. See First Preser-
vation Capital, Inc. v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 939 F. Supp. 1559, 1563-64
(S.D. Fla. 1996).
194. Susskind, supra note 86, at 44-47.
195. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 2693-96.
196. Judith Maute's proposed Rule 2.4, for example, specifies particular rules for un-
represented parties in mediation and the role of the "limited representative" mediator in
such contexts, pursuant to her reading of Rule 1.2(c). Maute, supra note 63, at 514-15.
However, her rule does not seem to deal with the thorny situation of one represented and
one unrepresented party in a mediation, where "power imbalances" are not just the par-
ties' but their counsel. I have experienced enormous ethical difficulties when both parties
were represented and I could see the wide disparities of quality of counsel (even when
economic resources were relatively equal, such as when all counsel came from quality law
firms but still performed with gross disparities of skill). If a mediator is committed to
"fair"outcomes as suggested by Susskind, it does not help to defer to the argument that the
parties were represented and therefore the mediator is absolved from all responsibility for
the agreement. Here, mediators have far less "power" and ability to do anything than
judges or arbitrators who still have both decision-making power and the ability to provide
reasoned opinions for their choices.
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practices that focus on particular techniques for realigning or
rebalancing power in any case where power imbalances occur,
whether parties are represented or not.1 97 All of these are efforts to
ensure "fairness" of process or "justice" of outcome in ADR proceed-
ings, but the enormous difficulty of defining such ambiguous terms as
"public interest' or "disempowered party" makes regulation nigh im-
possible and demonstrates why rule drafters often revert either to
generalized precatory language like "the neutrals shall not preside
over an unjust outcome" or to "objective factors" like "unrepresented
party" that may not respond to all the harms and ills intended to be
corrected. This is why lawmakers, as well as ethics rules drafters,
often prefer to "punt" and leave standards of ethics or "conscion-
ability" to the parties. If the parties consent in an informed way, we
defer to their agreement. 98 I am prepared to make real consent, a
necessary, if not sufficient, condition for "just" ADR and thus, I be-
lieve that at least some of the legal challenges to pre-dispute contrac-
tual commitments to ADR 19 9 will eventually be overturned as being
not freely consented to.
What then do I suggest? Despite my concerns that the Joint Stan-
dards for the Conduct of Mediators, for example, is too broad and am-
biguous in the particular areas which need texture and detail, by
virtue of the complexity of the tasks involved in ADR (i.e., conflicts,
advice giving, and evaluation), I do think we can specify some "discre-
tionary"2 ' aspirational standards which commit us to providing alter-
native justice, as well as alternative dispute resolution, based on
adherence to ethical, moral and "good" non-adversary principles.
Outcomes should not be coerced (there must be real consent); parties
should feel as if they have been given a fair opportunity to choose
197. See MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S. G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION
118 (1996) (discussing the issues and techniques implicated in "power balancing"); see also
PHYLLIS BECK KRITEK, NEGOTIATING AT AN UNEVEN TABLE: DEVELOPING MORAL
COURAGE IN RESOLVING OUR CONFLICTS 161-324 (1994); see generally Grillo, supra note
15 (discussing the diverse and opposing contexts of mediation in family court cases from a
gender-conscious analysis).
198. Whether consent is enough to satisfy justice criteria remains a contested question
among jurisprudes. See ROBIN WEST, THE OTHER UTILITARIANS (1996). In ADR ethics
we must be concerned about whether consent is real and thus, will have to carefully scruti-
nize and perhaps go beyond simple contract enforcement standards or important process
issues will be merged (and lost) in contract doctrine (as I believe has already happened
with Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence). See Paul Carrington and Paul Haagen,
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Cr. REV. 331 (1997).
199. Such as in many banking, consumer, health, and employment contracts.
200. I use the term in the sense offered by William Simon. See William Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, .101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1988).
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(self-determination) and participate in their proceedings (democratic
participation); and the process should be conducted by parties and
neutrals who behave fairly (and without partisanship as third parties,
even if they can not be totally neutral and detached). This may seem
like a process-based ethics,2 ' and I have, in other contexts, urged
some substantive evaluation of negotiated results, 20 2 but we must be-
gin there. I think we can hope to command that solutions reached
through ADR be fair and just, but we will inevitably have to rest on
the common law development of the particularities of the ethics of the
processes (which are different and varied) that make up ADR and
which, at least in the case of some negotiation and mediation, have
different goals or objectives informing their ethics.
In short, adversarial ethics will not inform what is good "ethical"
practice at either the micro-behavioral 20 3 level or at the macro-justice
level. 2° Like good common law lawyers and ethicists, we will deduce
our "pragmatic" ethics from the specifics of the new world of prob-
lem-solving we hope(d) to create with distinctively different processes.
As I have argued for the substantive justification of ADR (and
settlement) on the basis of democratic, party-empowering participa-
tion, consent and quality of solutions, and outcomes,20 5 then so must
the ethics (and justice) of ADR be judged by these goals and purposes
and not the goals or purposes of adversary representation. There are
different processes because these processes have different purposes
and therefore, they must be judged in relation to what they promise
and deliver. To judge the practice and ethics of ADR by the same
standards as adversary litigation is by definition to find it wanting be-
cause it is often designed precisely to avoid legalistic and adversarial
results. If we are to have better quality outcomes for dispute resolu-
201. Years ago Peter Strauss at Columbia Law School accused me of being the ultimate
"process person"-do you teach any "substance" at all, he asked? (I teach Procedure, Ne-
gotiation, Legal Ethics, Mediation and ADR, and have taught Trial Advocacy, Administra-
tive Process, and Civil Rights and Labor Law. The last two must at least meet the criteria
of "substance.") Peter Strauss, it should be noted, is well known for teaching and writing
about administrative and regulatory process.
202. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 1162, 1213-19 (suggesting more
substantive review of mass tort class action settlements).
203. There is growing empirical evidence that adversarialism does produce bad and
"uncivil" behavior. See American Bar Found., Uncivil Litigation: Problematic Behavior in
Large Law Firms, Rss. L., Fall 1996, at 1 (reporting on research of Robert Nelson).
204. Internationalists report that American legalization and adversarialism may be
"distorting" international trade law under GAIT and WTO procedures. See Interview
with Richard Diamond (transcript on file with author); see generally DEZALAY & GARTH,
supra note 56, at 115-318 (discussing the various international arbitration approaches).
205. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 2692-93.
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tion, for both the parties within them and for the legitimacy and ac-
ceptability of the process, then our ethics rules will have to reflect
these different underlying goals:
1. Party consent;
2. Democratic participation (of clients vis-a-vis lawyers and
multiple parties when disputes involve more than two dyadic
players);
3. Responsive and particularized solutions to legal disputes and
transactions, which do no worse harm to the parties (or other
third parties) than non-resolution of the dispute;
4. An orientation to joint, not individualized, problem-solv-
ing,2 °6 with a concomitant; and
5. "Problem-solving," rather. than "adversarial" orientation to
legal disputes and transactions.
Parties should seek to solve the underlying issues between them,
which does not preclude obtaining legal rulings and judgments, where
necessary, but it should preclude an orientation to "beating the other
side" just for the sport of it. Whether it is possible to draft ethics rules
and standards that reflect these goals, different from adversary repre-
sentation, remains to be seen, but we must keep in mind that we are
seeking different goals and perhaps different ethics.
V. . CONCLUSION: OF ROLES AND RULEs-ADR'S NEED FOR ITS
OWN ETHICS
I know I have here raised more questions than I have answered,
but my hope has been to make us all realize that ADR, in its various
forms, requires more textured ethics and standards that meet its own
demands and requirements. If we are really to attempt to achieve bet-
ter, more creative, quality forms of dispute resolution that depart
from traditional adversarial practices of lawyers, we will have to de-
velop (and confront and discuss) the different issues that less adver-
sarial forms of practice present to us. Since the underlying goals and
values to be served by ADR are often different from the goals of ad-
versary practice, it should come as no surprise that adversarial lawyer
ethics will not provide the answers to non-adversarial (or at least less
206. In negotiation parlance, this is a utilitarian, Pareto-optimal approach to problem-
solving; in other contexts I have urged it as a humanistic "ethic of care" that takes account
of the opponent in legal problem solving. See Menkel-Meadow, What's Gender Got to Do
With It? The Politics and Morality of an Ethic of Care, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
265, 289-93 (1996).
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adversarial) dispute resolution efforts. I look forward to the chal-
lenges ahead.
